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The Performance Implications of Membership in Competing Firm Constellations: 
Evidence from the Global Airline Industry 
 
Abstract 
Constellations are alliances among multiple autonomous firms, such that these groups compete 
against each other in the same or similar industries for both clients and members.  Although past 
research has evidenced the existence of constellations in several industry contexts, the 
performance implications of constellation membership have not been examined in detail.  
Following Gomes-Casseres (1994), I outline sources of membership benefits and offer novel 
hypotheses about how group organization—i.e., whether the constellation is explicit (based on 
formal, multilateral agreements) or implicit (informal clusters based on the structure of bilateral 
ties among firms)—affects those sources.  Namely, I propose that generic group characteristics, 
which determine the total value generated by the group, contribute more to explaining interfirm 
performance differences in explicit constellations than in implicit ones.   However, this effect is 
reversed in the case of member-specific attributes, which allow firms to better capture 
differential membership benefits within the same group.  Thus, both the total value created in 
constellations and how this value is distributed among members are contingent on patterns of 
group organization.  Evidence from the global airline industry, which has witnessed the 
formation of both implicit and explicit constellations, supports this theory.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Many industries are witnessing the formation of firm “constellations” competing against each 
other for the attraction of new members and for the penetration of their products or services in 
customer markets (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; 1996).  In the computer and microprocessor 
industries, examples abound where firms pool their resources to sponsor competing technologies 
and standards (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and Bruderer, 1995; Hwang and Burgers, 
1997; Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001).  In telecommunications, firms have developed 
linkages with multiple partners to expand the reach of their networks (Joshi, Kashlak, and 
Sherman, 1998).   Financial exchanges are coalescing into global groups offering distinct 
contracts and negotiation platforms (Domowitz, 1995).  Global airlines, the focus of this study, 
have also formed groupings competing for international traffic.  For instance, a traveler wishing 
to fly from Kansas City, US, to Gothenburg, Sweden, can use alternative airline groupings 
offering connections through distinct intermediate hubs.  The traveler can use the services of the 
“Star Alliance”—e.g., United Airlines through Chicago and then Lufthansa through Frankfurt—
or, alternatively, the services of the “Oneworld” group—e.g., American Airlines through Dallas 
and then British Airways through London (Hanlon, 1999; ter Kuile, 1997).  All these 
constellations share similar features: they represent alliances with multiple, rather than simply 
two firms; their members have a considerable degree of autonomy, in some cases actively 
switching between groups; and their markets usually reach global dimensions.      
Competing constellations have received sparse attention in the literature on 
interorganizational collaboration.
1  Although there has been a growing interest in 
interorganizational networks as sources of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 
Nohria, and Zaheer, 2000), empirical studies have not paid enough attention to the dynamics of 
                                                 
1  I follow Gomes-Casseres (1996) by adopting the term “constellations” (see also Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-
Lindquist, and Borgatti, 1998), even though in a previous work he used the term “alliance networks” (Gomes-
Casseres, 1994).  Constellations have received different names in the literature, such as “strategic blocks” (Nohria 
and Garcia-Pont, 1991) and “alliance blocks” (Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001).  There is also a literature on 
standard-setting alliances where firm groupings are referred to as “coalitions” (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, 
and Bruderer, 1995; Economides and Flyer, 1997) or “technological communities” (Wade, 1995).    2
competition in settings involving multiple networks (Gulati, 1998: 310).  In other words, 
empirical research has focused on individual networks in isolation—in general, “ego” networks 
or the web of alliances surrounding firms (e.g. Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati, 1999; McEvily 
and Zaheer, 1999; Uzzi, 1996)—rather than competing networks.  Yet, in instances where 
competition is shifting from firms to constellations, strategic implications can be profound, as a 
firm’s performance may crucially depend on which group it chooses to join (Gomes-Casseres, 
1996; Gulati, 1998).  Even though past research has empirically analyzed constellations in 
several industry contexts (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 
2001; Walker, 1988), the performance implications of constellation membership have not been 
examined in detail.   
In this study, I fill this void in two ways.  First, I present a framework to assess sources of 
membership benefits in the context of competing constellations.   Building upon Gomes-
Casseres (1994; 1996), I distinguish between benefits based on generic attributes of 
constellations—which I call constellation-specific attributes—and benefits based on differential 
characteristics of  firms within the same group—which I call member-specific attributes.  
Constellation-specific attributes include, for instance, the size of the constellation’s aggregated 
customer base in the presence of increasing returns from joint operations and sales.  Member-
specific attributes, in turn, correspond to the relative position of a firm within the group, such as 
its relative size or the extent to which it has bilateral agreements with other members.  While 
constellation-specific attributes determine the total value generated by the group, member-
specific attributes determine how that value is distributed among members.  Differential 
member-specific attributes imply that a firm may obtain higher benefits from membership than 
other firms even if they belong to the same group.     
In addition, I assess the role of group-level organizational patterns by studying both explicit 
and implicit constellations.  Explicit constellations involve formal, publicly known agreements 
with a multilateral fashion in that such agreements tend to be broad and general (i.e., applied to 
all members).  Implicit constellations, by contrast, are informal groupings “implied” from the   3
structure of bilateral agreements between firms, in such a way that members have relatively more 
bilateral ties to one another than to firms outside the constellation (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 
1991).  A central and novel proposition advanced by this study is that membership in explicit vs. 
implicit constellations moderates the effect of constellation- vs. member-specific attributes on 
firm performance.  For instance, since explicit constellations involve general, formalized 
agreements that facilitate coordination and cooperation, the possibility to internalize interfirm 
externalities is greater than in the case of implicit constellations.  Thus, constellation-specific 
attributes will tend to become relatively more important determinants of firm performance in 
explicit constellations than in implicit ones.  By contrast, the lack of general, overarching 
agreements in implicit constellations implies that there is more room for individual strategies 
aimed at increasing both members’ access to the resources and customer bases of the group and 
their compensation for granting access to such resources and markets.  Thus, member-specific 
attributes will tend to become relatively more important determinants of firm performance in 
implicit constellations than in explicit ones. 
The global airline industry provides an appropriate empirical context to study competing 
constellations.  Airlines have aggressively formed alternative groups competing in international 
markets for both passengers and member airlines through the combination of international 
routes, joint coordination of operations, and consolidation of marketing tools such as frequent 
flyer programs (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Hanlon, 1999; Oum and Yu, 1998).  Furthermore, the 
industry has witnessed the formation of both explicit and implicit constellations.  Explicit 
constellations have emerged especially in the mid 1990s, including (among others) the Star 
Alliance and the Oneworld group, exemplified before.  But there is also evidence that implicit 
airline constellations have existed before the emergence of explicit groups and in most cases 
appear to be expanded coalitions with explicit constellations as their core group; for instance, 
they include firms owned by or holding bilateral agreements with key members of an explicit 
constellation.  This provides an opportunity to compare the effect of membership in explicit vs. 
implicit constellations.  To be sure, an important shortcoming in using the airline industry for the   4
purposes of this study is that regulatory barriers prevent access to global resources and markets 
through the outright acquisition of, say, domestic airport facilities or carriers (e.g. Hanlon, 1999; 
Oum and Yu, 1998).  Thus, in other contexts hierarchical organization may be a substitute for the 
use of constellations.  But this industry particularity also constitutes a desirable empirical feature, 
since it allows the researcher to focus on constellation-related choices rather than on choices 
involving other organizational modes.   
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In the second section, I present hypotheses about the 
performance implications of membership in firm constellations.  In the third section, I provide 
background information on the airline industry and the formation of airline constellations.  In the 
fourth section, data and methods are presented.  In the fifth session, I discuss the empirical 
results.  I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that explicit constellations appear to 
enhance the effect of constellation-specific attributes on firm performance, whereas in implicit 
constellations the effect of member-specific attributes tends to be more pronounced.  Concluding 
remarks follow.    
 
CONSTELLATION MEMBERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Constellations are alliances among multiple autonomous firms, such that these groups 
compete against each other in the same or similar industries for both clients and members.
2  In 
this section, I distinguish between explicit and implicit constellations, and then present the 
theoretical framework linking constellation membership to firm performance. 
                                                 
2 It is useful to discuss what constellations are not.  Constellations differ from business groups, such as keiretsu in 
Japan and chaebols in Korea.  While business groups are in general intra-national organizational forms supported by 
a common institutional environment—e.g., shared culture or legal regimes (Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001)—constellations tend to span different national and institutional borders.  Constellations also differ 
from strategic groups.  While those groups are defined as sets of firms defined by mobility barriers to move from 
one group to another (Caves and Porter, 1977), constellations compete not only for final customers but also for 
additional members, which can migrate from alternative groups (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Hwang and Burgers, 1997).  
Furthermore, differently from strategic groups, constellations may exhibit heterogeneity with respect to the 
resources brought by members; in some cases, constellations can be comprised of firms belonging to distinct 
strategic groups (e.g. Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Walker, 1988).  Finally, constellations differ from cartels.  
Gomes-Casseres (1994: 65) notes that while cartels are stand-alone entities to reduce competition, in most cases 
there are more than one constellation in an industry competing fiercely against each other.        5
Explicit and implicit constellations    
Constellations can be either explicit or implicit.
3  Explicit constellations are coalitions 
involving formal agreements in a multilateral fashion: such agreements tend to be general (i.e., 
applied to all members) and include a broad range of activities.  In addition, explicit 
constellations are publicly known; in most cases, they are even associated with brand names, and 
their members constitute separate entities and committees to manage the affairs of the group.  
Examples of explicit constellations are coalitions of international financial exchanges 
(Domowitz, 1995) and groupings of global airlines emerging especially in the mid 1990s 
(Hanlon, 1999), which I study in this paper.   
Implicit constellations, in turn, are informal firm groupings “implied” from the structure of 
bilateral ties between firms.
4  More precisely, an implicit constellation is a cluster of firms 
showing relatively more ties to one another than to firms outside the group (Nohria and Garcia-
Pont, 1991: 109).
5  Previous research has defined constellations implicitly based on the structure 
of bilateral ties between firms, and empirically examined their boundaries using clustering 
algorithms.  Thus, Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) describe implicit constellations in the global 
auto industry, and Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven (2001) reveal clusters of firms in the 
microprocessor and computer industry devised to introduce the RISC architecture.  In some 
cases, implicit constellations may also be “expanded” versions of explicit constellations in that 
they may include firms tied to key (though not all) members of the latter.
6  
                                                 
3 This distinction is adapted from Axelrod et al., (1995), who focus specifically on standard-setting coalitions (see 
also Farrell and Saloner, 1988).   
4 Note that bilateral ties in an implicit constellation may be formal, i.e., associated with formal (bilateral) contracts 
or equity stakes.  Implicit constellations are said to be informal because, unlike explicit constellations, there are no 
general, formal agreements governing the joint action of firms beyond what is dictated by their bilateral 
arrangements.  
5 Such implicit groups can take several forms (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; 
Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001).  They can have a “clique”-like structure such as when firm 1 has a 
marketing agreement with firm 2, which in turn licenses a technology from firm 3, which in turn partially owns firm 
1.  They can also have a “star”-like structure such as when a firm licenses its technology to several other firms, 
which in turn have few agreements with suppliers of alternative technologies.   
6 Thus, even though Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven (2001) define the boundaries of RISC groups implicitly, they 
do note that some groups include explicit consortiums such as SPARC (centered on Sun Microsystems) and 88-
Open (centered on Motorola).   6
Constellations and firm performance 
In any industry, firms face the opportunity to transact with several other firms and form 
interorganizational networks.  Denote the opportunity set of firm as S, which is simply a 
collection of firms indexed by i = 1, …, N.  Based on their own opportunity sets, firms choose to 
establish linkages or ties to one another, involving the exchange of resources.
7  In principle, such 
ties could be governed by any organizational mode from markets to hierarchies.  For simplicity, I 
assume that firm boundaries are fixed.  Thus, although linkages can involve partial ownership 
ties (equity stakes), they cannot be fully hierarchical: each element of S is a separate firm.
8  Such 
linkages cause a partition of set S into several sub-sets denoted by Cj ⊆ S, j = 1, …, J.  I call 
constellations only sub-sets with more than one unit; thus, by definition, a firm i not belonging to 
any constellation is considered to belong to a singleton {i}.  I also suppose that firms can belong 
to only one constellation at a time, i.e., all sets Cj are disjoint.  In the case of implicit 
constellations, the partition of the set of firms S is inferred from the pattern of bilateral ties 
among firms; thus, linkages represent either bilateral alliances or equity stakes.  In the case of 
explicit constellations, the partition of set S is straightforward: linkages result from publicly 
announced coalitions of firms.  For the moment, I make no distinction between implicit and 
explicit constellations, but return to this discussion later on.   
Suppose the performance of a firm i belonging to a constellation Cj is given by 
(1) yi = π(x(Cj), zi(Cj)) + fi, 
where π(.) indicates the benefits that firm i attains by being a member of Cj, and fi denotes firm-
specific effects independent of constellation membership.  Following Gomes-Casseres (1994), I 
assume that constellation benefits are influenced by two vectors:  x(Cj), representing generic 
                                                 
7 I simplify the analysis by focusing on horizontal transactions only—i.e., networks in the same industry—in order 
to avoid a distinction between vertical and horizontal ties.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that alliances in the airline 
industry, which are the focus of this paper, are mostly horizontal, i.e., among carriers (Hanlon, 1999: 240-242).  The 
simultaneous consideration of horizontal and vertical ties, however, can be important in other contexts (see e.g. 
Lazzarini, Chaddad, and Cook, 2001).      
8 This is a realistic assumption in the airline industry—due to regulatory restrictions to fully acquire foreign 
carriers—but not necessarily in other industries.  I provide more comments on this important issue in the conclusion 
section of this paper.     7
attributes of group Cj, and zi(Cj), representing firm i’s individual attributes relative to other 
constellation members (see also Gulati, 1998: 310).  I call these characteristics constellation-
specific and member-specific attributes respectively.  While constellation-specific attributes (e.g., 
the size of its aggregated customer base) determine the total value generated by the group, 
member-specific attributes (e.g., a firm’s relative size) determine how that value is distributed 
among members.  Thus, one should expect two sources of interfirm performance differences in 
the presence of constellations.  First, in situations where groups are heterogeneous, distinct 
constellations with distinct constellation-specific attributes will yield differential membership 
benefits.  Second, in situations where members are heterogeneous, member-specific attributes 
will induce differential performance for firms belonging to the same constellation.  In other 
words, some firms may attain higher membership benefits even if they belong to the same group.  
Figure 1 schematizes such possible differences.  
<Figure 1 around here> 
Constellation-specific attributes 
A firm can benefit from joining a constellation when it can capture positive externalities 
emanating from the presence of other firms in the group.  Such externalities occur when the 
benefits that a firm can attain by employing its own resources and targeting its own markets 
increase when these are articulated, total or partially, with the resources and markets of other 
firms in the constellation.   
Positive externalities can be scale-driven.  The benefits that customers attain by consuming 
the products of the constellation may increase with the expected numbers of users, thus 
characterizing a situation of network externalities (Economides, 1996; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; 
Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 1994; Rohlfs, 1974).  For instance, the attractiveness of a technological 
standard depends on the extent to which other customers adopt that standard (Arthur, 1989; 
Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and Bruderer, 1995; David, 1985; Majumdar and 
Venkataraman, 1998; Wade, 1995).  This is particularly important when customers face   8
switching costs to pursue alternative products supplied by other firms,
9 thus implying that the 
attraction of new customers to a particular constellation requires, to a large extent, that their 
individual suppliers become members.  In addition, unit costs may decrease and services may 
improve due to jointly orchestrated operations.  The presence of such increasing returns to scale, 
although different, is functionally similar to the case of positive network externalities (Tirole, 
1988: 409) since it implies that the benefits of a constellation’s product increase with the extent 
of its demand.  This discussion implies that the size of the aggregated customer base of the group 
is an important constellation-specific attribute in the presence of scale-driven externalities.  
Thus: 
Hypothesis 1.  In contexts involving scale-driven externalities, members of a constellation 
with a large aggregated customer base will outperform members of a constellation with a 
small aggregated customer base.  
Membership benefits can also be due to resource-driven externalities.  Some argue that 
value-enhancing interorganizational relationships are based on the exploitation of resource 
complementarities, in the sense that the benefits to use a resource increase when it is jointly used 
with other resources (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Richardson, 1972; Teece, 1992).  This suggests 
that the resource diversity of the group may be an important constellation-specific attribute in the 
presence of resource-driven externalities, for three main reasons.  First, customers may have a 
direct taste for variety (Church and Gandal, 1992).
10  Second, a firm may be able to improve the 
development or introduction of its own products by capturing spillovers from constellation 
members assuming specialized and diverse roles (Feldman and Audretsch, 1999; Kogut, 2000; 
Robertson and Langlois, 1995).  For instance, a foreign firm can use local firms’ knowledge of 
domestic markets in several countries to introduce its products.  Third, resource diversity implies 
that intra-group competition will not be strong (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and 
                                                 
9 For instance, customers may need to invest in learning to understand alternative products or services (e.g., 
software) and in some cases they are subject to marketing policies increasing the benefits of “loyalty” (e.g., frequent 
flyer programs) (Klemperer, 1987). 
10 Thus, a constellation offering hardware in conjunction with a large diversity of software will tend to be preferred 
by customers than a group without such variety.   9
Bruderer, 1995; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Lawless and Anderson, 1996).  By contrast, firms 
holding similar resources tend to engage in direct competition since they are able to offer 
substitute products and thus undercut one another (Chen, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1996).  This 
discussion implies:     
Hypothesis 2.  In contexts involving resource-driven externalities, members of a constellation 
with high resource diversity will outperform members of a constellation with low resource 
diversity.  
There are arguments supporting an opposite prediction, though.  Thus, Olk (1997) 
hypothesizes that groups where firms hold distinct resources will have more difficulty integrating 
their efforts.  Similarly, Kraatz (1998) argues that resource similarity facilitates the formation of 
strong ties among group members, thereby supporting coordination of joint efforts.  As for the 
effect of resource diversity on competition, Caves and Porter (1977) suggest that tacit collusion 
is facilitated when firms hold similar, instead of diverse, resources.  The reason, the argument 
goes, is that similar firms are more likely to recognize their strategic interdependence and pursue 
joint action (see also Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Peteraf, 1993).
11 
But the existence of positive externalities will not, by itself, guarantee that firms will be able 
and even willing to share resources and markets.  Although allying firms in constellations 
preserve their autonomy, arm’s-length exchanges will not suffice for the internalization of 
interfirm externalities (Arrow, 1974).  Coordination failure may induce the collective adoption of 
inferior options (Schelling, 1978).
12  Lack of enough cooperation may also result if members act 
opportunistically, for instance by free riding on collective investments (Nault and Tyagi, 2001; 
Olson, 1965) or expropriating other firms’ proprietary resources in activities outside the 
                                                 
11 In this case, the image of a value-enhancing constellation is more akin to the image of a strategic group, where 
firms hold similar resource profiles.  Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) differentiate between “pooling” constellations, 
where most members belong to the same strategic group, and “complementary” constellations, where most members 
belong to distinct strategic groups and hence hold distinct resource profiles.  
12 The choice of competing technological standards in standard-setting alliances is an example (Economides, 1996; 
Farrell and Saloner, 1988).  Coordination failure is aggravated when, due to bounded rationality, firms do not know 
all possible actions they could take and their relative payoffs (Foss, 2001)—for instance, which particular resource 
combinations may lead to superior outcomes—and when they do not know other members’ preferences (Farrell and 
Saloner, 1985).     10
constellation (Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Teece, 1992; Williamson, 1985).  A dense web of 
bilateral ties among firms—i.e., when they are extensively connected with one another—will 
help to mitigate such failures.  Several authors propose that dense networks promote the 
emergence of shared norms and informal sanctioning mechanisms that enhance cooperation 
(Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt, 2000; Uzzi, 1996).  For 
instance, if a member of a dense group acts opportunistically, it is likely that in a dense network 
information about its behavior will be disseminated to other members, which may sever their ties 
with that firm or apply other types of sanctions (Williamson, 1991: 290-291).  By enhancing 
group cohesion, network density also tends to facilitate joint action and improve communication, 
consequently reducing the likelihood of coordination failure (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-
Lindquist, and Borgatti, 1998).  Therefore:  
Hypothesis 3. Members of a constellation with high density of bilateral ties among firms will 
outperform members of a constellation with low density of bilateral ties. 
Member-specific attributes 
While constellation-specific attributes determine the total value generated by the group, 
member-specific attributes define how that value is divided among members.  If firms agree to 
articulate their resources and pool their customer bases, they will need to define possible ways to 
do so, and arrange schemes to compensate for the access to resources and markets.  Such 
compensation schemes do not need to be pecuniary, such as in the form of prices for each 
resource; firms may, for instance, negotiate on the access to certain resources or markets.  Using 
Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, I discuss two mechanisms that members can use to articulate 
resources and markets within the group, and to define the underlying compensation schemes: exit 
and voice.  While exit is a bargaining mechanism based on threats to terminate the ongoing 
interorganizational association, voice “involves dialog, persuasion, and sustained organizational 
effort” (Williamson, 1985: 257).  The feasibility and outcome of such mechanisms will be 
determined by particular member-specific attributes, which in turn will create differential 
benefits for firms belonging to the same constellation, as I discuss next.     11
Exit   
To understand the nature of exit tactics, denote Π(Cj) = ∑i ∈ Cj π(x(Cj), zi(Cj)) as the collective 
value that firms can achieve by being members of constellation Cj, and assume for simplicity that 
members exhaust all possibilities of value creation within the group.  Then define the variable 
(2) ∆k(Cj) = Π(Cj) – Π(Cj\{k}), 
which is simply the change in the aggregated value of constellation Cj if member k departs the 
group; in the language of cooperative game theory, ∆k(Cj) is the marginal contribution of k to 
coalition Cj (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994: 291).  If the marginal contribution of firm k is 
large, then it will be able to threaten its departure from the group unless it obtains higher benefits 
in the form of compensation schemes.  However, other members may object to this threat by 
arguing that k will also lose if they leave the group.  Thus, exit threats will only be effective in a 
practical sense if a member does not incur substantial losses by forming coalitions with 
alternative firms.  In general, members with large marginal contributions to the constellation and 
who are able to switch to and benefit from alternative constellations will tend to capture a larger 
portion of the group’s collective value.   
In the presence of scale-driven externalities, the relative size of a member’s customer base 
will be an important member-specific attribute influencing intra-constellation bargaining, since a 
member with relatively large customer base will provide a high marginal contribution to other 
members in the form of network externalities or gains of scale.  Thus, large members can 
threaten to leave the group to partner with larger firms or simply go alone (Economides and 
Flyer, 1997; Katz and Shapiro, 1985), which would cause a substantial reduction in the level of 
scale-driven externalities to small members.  This asymmetry will grant large members an ability 
to negotiate better deals within the group.  Thus:  
Hypothesis 4.  In contexts involving scale-driven externalities, a member with a large 
customer base relative to the aggregated customer base of its constellation will outperform 
another constellation member with a relatively small customer base.      12
In the presence of resource-driven externalities, in turn, an important member-specific 
attribute will be the extent to which a member controls critical resources within its constellation.  
Resources are critical when their withdrawal from the set of resources available to the group 
substantially reduces the benefits from the articulation of the remaining resources.  Similarly to a 
large customer base in the presence of network externalities, members controlling critical 
resources will have a privileged position in bargaining processes (Harrigan, 1988; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).  This is because the departure of a member controlling a critical resource will, 
by definition, sharply reduce the level of interfirm externalities within the group; thus, the 
marginal contribution of that member will tend to large.  Consequently: 
Hypothesis 5.  In contexts involving resource-driven externalities, a member controlling 
critical resources within its constellation will outperform another constellation member 
without control of such critical resources.    
Members holding ties to several other firms outside the constellation will also be able to 
benefit from internal bargaining processes.  This is because there are sunk costs to form linkages 
among firms (Kranton and Minehart, 2000), for instance in the form of search costs and 
investments in exchange interfaces.  Thus, it will be relatively less costly for a member to depart 
from its current constellation and form a new group when that member has existing linkages with 
alternative firms.  In other words, outside ties tend to grant members salient exit options, thereby 
increasing the credibility of exit threats.  Additionally, outside ties tend to be less redundant 
(Burt, 1992) than ties to existing constellation members.  Consequently, holding such ties tends 
to increase a member’s marginal contribution to the constellation, as they represent avenues to 
obtain external resources and lure new firms to the group.  These arguments lead to: 
Hypothesis 6.  A member with bilateral ties to several firms outside its constellation will 
outperform another constellation member holding no or few bilateral ties to outside firms.      
Voice   
While exit tactics are based on the relative value that firms add to alternative constellations, 
voice is based on deliberate actions to obtain group resources and to influence collective 
decisions.  The establishment of extensive bilateral ties to constellation members is likely to be a   13
key mechanism to exercise voice in the group.  An obvious reason is that bilateral ties represent 
direct ways to get access to the resources and markets of particular members.  But it is also 
reasonable to suppose that those ties represent conduits of information and influence beyond 
their own particular terms (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996: 120).  Notice that, differently 
from firms, constellations do not have strict hierarchical relations where certain agents are 
responsible for most decisions.  Thus, members that are “more centrally located than others, in 
the sense that they are directly connected to many members” (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 56) will 
have an improved ability to exercise voice.  Such members will be more able to control the flow 
of information within the constellation, lead joint efforts, and influence collective strategies in 
their favor (Barley, Freeman, and Hybels, 1992; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Money, 
1998).
13  This discussion implies: 
Hypothesis 7.  A member holding bilateral ties to several firms belonging to its constellation 
will outperform another constellation member holding no or few bilateral ties to other 
members. 
Group organization: implicit vs. explicit constellations 
I propose that the constellation’s organizational form, namely whether it is implicit or 
explicit, will moderate the effect of constellation- and member-specific attributes on firm 
performance.  Consider first the effect of constellation-specific attributes.  The general nature of 
agreements involving explicit constellations increases the access of firms to the markets and 
resources of the whole group, which in implicit constellations is defined solely on a bilateral 
basis.  This process is facilitated by the adoption of common, standardized exchange procedures 
in explicit groups.  Standardization creates compatibility across members’ production and 
marketing systems, thereby expanding the possibility to exploit complementarities (Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001; Thompson, 1967).   In addition, the process of creating and managing formal, 
general agreements also represents an opportunity for multilateral communication and 
negotiation, which reduces the likelihood that the group will be trapped into inferior collective 
                                                 
13 Similar arguments support the idea that central individuals will have higher influence in the process of decision-
making within firms (e.g. Brass and Burkhardt, 1992; Krackhardt, 1990).   14
strategies (Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Schelling, 1978).  Explicit constellations may be associated 
with formal boards and committees, which not only act as control devices, but also enhance the 
achievement of collective agreements.  Once established, formal agreements can also curb 
opportunistic behavior by establishing clauses specifying the role and obligations of members 
(Poppo and Zenger, forthcoming).
14  Therefore, by facilitating coordination and cooperation, 
explicit constellations tend to augment the internalization of interfirm externalities borne by 
constellation-specific attributes.       
Furthermore, the fact that explicit constellations are publicly known can influence 
expectations about the prospects of the group.  Thus, the market penetration of a constellation’s 
products in the presence of network externalities is largely dependent on whether customers 
expect the constellation to thrive or not (Economides, 1996; Katz and Shapiro, 1985).  Promotion 
tactics and even brand names attached to the constellation are helpful precisely because they can 
help to influence such expectations (Katz and Shapiro, 1994: 107).  In a similar vein, Human and 
Provan (2000) argue that the formalization of interfirm networks brings legitimization and 
visibility to the group, which helps to attract not only new customers but also supporting actors 
such as suppliers and investors.  This tends to increase the level of externalities that firms can 
internalize by collaborating.  Collectively, the arguments above suggest that the effect of 
constellation-attributes will be more pronounced in explicit than implicit constellations.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 8.  Constellation-specific attributes will contribute more to explaining interfirm 
performance differences in explicit constellations than in implicit ones.    
                                                 
14 One might argue that informal sanctioning mechanisms brought by network density, which is a constellation-
specific attribute, may actually substitute for explicit agreements in promoting cooperation (e.g. Granovetter, 1985).  
Contrary to this view, I argue that explicit constellations increase the effectiveness of such informal sanctioning 
mechanisms.  First, because communication is improved and hence information about opportunistic behavior is 
more easily disseminated in the network.  Second, because formal organization increases the likelihood that 
“boycotts” against deviants will be carried out (see Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994).  Due to improved member 
participation, offended parties will have more leeway to convince other members to apply sanctions.  As a result of 
these sanctions, deviants will be more strongly penalized in dense rather than sparse networks because defection will 
trigger the termination of several bilateral ties with constellation members.  Notice that such ties may involve 
activities beyond those included in the constellation’s explicit agreement.     15
In the case of member-specific attributes, this effect is reversed.  The benefits that a firm can 
attain by being part of an implicit constellation will be largely dependent on its position in the 
group.  Since in implicit constellations there are no general terms guiding joint action, there is 
more room for exit and voice tactics to define collective strategies and compensation schemes.  
For instance, large and central firms tend to assume leading roles in implicit constellations, since 
they are likely to have a higher ability to form and manage multiple ties.  In addition, the absence 
of general agreements in implicit constellations implies that a firm must establish direct ties to 
other members to increase its access to their resources and markets.  Otherwise, that firm will 
only attain indirect membership benefits through its ties to central members, which will act as 
“intermediaries” in the transfer of interfirm externalities.   
By contrast, in explicit constellations the action shifts, albeit partially, from bilateral to 
multilateral negotiations.  As agreements become more comprehensive and general, bilateral 
agreements become less instrumental in delivering direct access to the resources and markets of 
the whole group.  Increased participation in the process of decision making—for instance, 
through committees or boards—tend to increase members’ voice over collective strategies and 
redistribution rules.  In addition, since the formalization of interfirm alliances demands 
idiosyncratic expenses to multilaterally negotiate agreements and create common exchange 
procedures, the efficacy of exit tactics diminishes.  Other things being equal, firms will lose more 
value if they defect from an explicit than an implicit constellation.  This discussion suggests that 
in explicit constellations the effect of member-specific attributes will tend to be attenuated 
relative to implicit constellations, thereby leading to: 
Hypothesis 9.  Member-specific attributes will contribute more to explaining interfirm 
performance differences in implicit constellations than in explicit ones.  
 
CONSTELLATIONS IN THE GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Cooperation and competition in the airline industry   16
Since the deregulation of the U.S. industry and the increasing privatization of carriers in 
Europe and East Asia, competition between airline companies has reached a global status due to 
the desire to expand route networks internationally (Morrison and Winston, 1995; Pustay, 1992; 
Taneja, 1988).  However, existing regulatory policies that constrain the acquisition and use of 
foreign resources pose major challenges to international air travel.  Although there are instances 
of companies holding equity stakes in international carriers, most governments disallow 
complete foreign ownership of domestic airlines and airport facilities (Hanlon, 1999; Pustay, 
1992).  The international air traffic is also heavily regulated.  Since the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the permission to carry out international traffic has 
been established by agreements between countries mainly on a bilateral basis (Holloway, 1998; 
Oum and Yu, 1998; Pustay, 1992; Taneja, 1988).  In addition, it is rare that an airline is granted 
permission to service routes within foreign countries, which is called “cabotage” (Hanlon, 1999; 
Holloway, 1998).  In this context, alliances become a fundamental recourse for airlines to expand 
internationally (Oum and Yu, 1998; Park and Zhang, 2000; Park and Martin, 2001).  Reflecting 
this fact, the industry has witnessed the formation of several alliances between carriers, 
especially during the 1990s.  Estimates indicate that in 2000 more than 80% of airline companies 
engaged in some form of alliance (Baker, 2001).   
The first airline alliances were purely bilateral, involving agreements between two carriers 
only.  The most common type of bilateral alliance is the so-called codesharing agreement, by 
which two carriers combine routes as a single composite product to customers. Usually one firm 
(the “marketing carrier”) sets the price and sells the flight, while the other firm (the “operating 
carrier”) becomes responsible for the connecting routes (Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann, 
2001).
15  Codesharing agreements usually involve substantial efforts to jointly coordinate the 
flow of passengers and baggage, as well as sharing of airport resources such as gates, lounges, 
                                                 
15 Partners receiving antitrust immunity from the U.S. Department of Transportation can also jointly price certain 
routes involving U.S. cities (Brueckner and Whalen, 2000).   17
check-in infrastructure, and ground personnel (Chen and Ross, 2000).
16  Carriers also engage in 
marketing agreements such as the establishment of joint frequent flyer programs (FFP) and 
combined promotion efforts. 
Explicit airline constellations, moving beyond purely bilateral deals, have emerged especially 
in the 1990s.  Most explicit constellations involve full marketing cooperation with respect to 
FFPs and promotions, besides joint access to airport facilities (such as lounges) controlled by 
individual members.  Some groups also offer comprehensive codesharing agreements involving 
several routes instead of bilateral agreements comprising few routes (Oum and Yu, 1998).  Thus, 
agreements tend to have a multilateral fashion, in that they are applicable to all members and 
broad in nature.
17  Estimates indicate that the five existing explicit airline constellations in 
2001—Star Alliance (including United Airlines, Lufthansa and SAS), Oneworld (including 
American Airlines and British Airways), SkyTeam (including Delta and Air France), 
Northwest/KLM (unofficially labeled “Wings”), and Qualiflyer (including Swissair and other 
European carriers)—contributed to almost 60% of the global air traffic, representing 203.3 
billion dollars in revenues (Baker, 2001).  (I present more details on the evolution and 
composition of these groups later.)  But there is evidence of the existence of implicit 
constellations prior to the emergence of most explicit airline groupings, corresponding to firm 
clusters based on extensive bilateral agreements (Whitaker, 1996).  As I discuss next, some 
implicit constellations also appear to be expanded coalitions with key (though not all) members 
of explicit constellations as their core group.  
Capturing externalities from airline constellations 
                                                 
16  A related type of alliance is the block space agreement, through which a marketing carrier buys a block of seats 
from an operating carrier and then sells those seats to its customers (Hanlon, 1999).  Block space agreements can 
also be used as a mechanism to transfer payments in codesharing alliances (Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann, 
2001).   
17 Even though some contractual features of those groups are truly multilateral (such as FFPs), an interviewed airline 
executive considers that, during the period covered in this study, most deals within explicit constellations still tended 
to be negotiated on a bilateral basis.  But there is a perception that such agreements are becoming more and more 
comprehensive.  Thus, the results presented here should be properly taken as conservative estimates of the impact of 
explicit groups.      18
Evidence suggests that there are both scale- and resource-driven externalities emanating from 
interorganizational linkages in the airline industry.  As discussed before, scale-driven 
externalities result mainly from demand aggregation and gains from scale generated by an 
increase in the size of the constellation.  When routes are jointly coordinated, as in the case of 
codesharing alliances, the quality of customer service will tend to increase since it resembles a 
“single-carrier” service with respect to check-in and baggage handling (Bamberger, Carlton, and 
Neumann, 2001; Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Youssef and Hansen, 1994).  Joint operations 
and marketing activities are also expected to reduce unit costs due to economies of scale 
(Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann, 2001; Oum and Yu, 1998; Park and Zhang, 2000).  As a 
result, improved service and lower costs will tend to increase demand for such coordinated 
services.
18     
FFPs magnify the extent of scale-driven externalities because of the costs they impose to 
customers to switch to alternative airlines.  Since FFPs reward customers who purchase tickets 
from the same carrier, “customers who switch between different companies are penalized 
relative to those who remain with a single firm” (Klemperer, 1987: 376).  Thus, by establishing 
joint FFPs, airlines can benefit from the captive demand of other firms.  FFPs can also be 
considered a particular type of standard since, once multiple carriers form a large network, 
customers will have increasing benefits if they continue using a particular FFP instead of 
programs offered by competitors.  As an executive from an airline member of a certain explicit 
constellation once affirmed, the combined FFP “is the glue to hold the alliance together” (quoted 
in Hanlon, 1999: 57).    
                                                 
18 Even if allying carriers monopolize connections comprising a route, prices may be lower than in the case of 
independent sale and pricing of such connections, which will also contribute to an increase in demand.  This is 
because when a single airline sets the price for the total route or partners jointly do so (in cases where they are 
granted antitrust immunity), “double marginalization” is eliminated.  The so-called Cournot double marginalization 
problem occurs when a monopolist pricing a downstream product introduces a mark-up over the mark-up of the 
monopolist offering a complementary, upstream product (see e.g. Economides and Salop, 1992).  The reduction in 
prices from the elimination of double marginalization when one firm or both firms price the whole nexus of products 
is expected to prompt demand.  Empirical evidence in the airline industry is corroborative (Bamberger, Carlton, and 
Neumann, 2001; Brueckner and Whalen, 2000).   19
Resource-driven externalities also appear to be important in the context of the global airline 
industry.  Given the recognition that “network strategy is the foundation upon which everything 
else in an airline is built” (Holloway, 1998: 280), access to the air transport infrastructure in 
foreign cities—especially airport facilities—is considered a fundamental resource for global 
airlines (Hanlon, 1999; Park and Martin, 2001).  This is because the articulation of resources 
owned by individual carriers allows for the exploitation of complementarities between routes.  
For instance, in a one-stop flight connecting two cities, “the two legs of the journey are two 
complementary components of the complete flight” (Encaoua, Moreaux, and Perrot, 1996: 703).  
To create this composite route, two or more carriers will need to coordinate the joint use of their 
local resources in origin, destination, and stop points.  Since global carriers face regulatory 
restrictions to invest in domestic feeders within foreign countries, they must ally with other 
airlines controlling local facilities, which in turn act as local hubs and thus help to bring local 
customers to the global network (Hanlon, 1999; Youssef and Hansen, 1994).  In this context, the 
resource-driven benefits of constellations may also be dependent on the extent to which some 
members specialize and develop competencies associated with small, local markets acting as 
feeders, while other members specialize in longer, international connections covering large 
markets (Bailey and Williams, 1988; Clougherty, 2002; Holloway, 1998).
19 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
This study uses information on the operations of 75 global airlines as well as their alliances 
and patterns of membership in constellations between 1995 and 2000.  The carriers in the sample 
represent about 81% of the total world passenger traffic in 2000, and 54 distinct countries (Table 
                                                 
19  Unlike scale-driven externalities, which presuppose gains from an increase in the size of the network and its 
customer base, resource-driven externalities are based on gains from traffic density (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; 
Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway, 1984), which allow airlines to schedule flights from or to different points and 
thus offer more options to customers.  To be sure, traffic density also enhances the flow of passengers and creates 
economies—e.g., more efficient utilization of aircraft and crew—which are akin to scale-driven externalities.  
However, traffic density presupposes the combination of qualitatively complementary routes, which are largely 
dependent on the resources available in the network rather than necessarily its size.    20
1).
20  The data come from multiple sources.  Carriers’ operational information, such as traffic and 
capacity, is obtained from the World Air Transport Statistics compiled by the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA).  Data on airline alliances and the evolution of constellations are 
taken from several issues of the magazine Airline Business, which conducts annual surveys on 
the alliance activity of the industry.  Since it is based on annual surveys, an advantage of this 
alliance database is that it provides a picture of alliances that were actually in place in a 
particular year.
21  I also obtain information on equity stakes among carriers from several issues 
of Airline Business.  Finally, I collect information on international routes serviced by carriers 
from the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) digest of statistics Traffic by Flight 
Stage.      
<Table 1 around here> 
The database involves information on individual carriers observed through time; thus, the 
data have a panel structure.  Besides the fact that alliances in the airline industry are prevalent 
and there is substantial heterogeneity in terms of routes serviced, countries of origin, dominance 
of local resources (such as airport facilities), performance, and composition of constellations, the 
database has several other attractive features to test the hypotheses presented above.  First, 
airlines are in general focused businesses (Gimeno, 1999; Miller and Chen, 1994).  This tends to 
reduce error in the analysis of the relationship between alliances and overall firm performance, 
which in diversified companies can be affected by unobserved variables due to other business 
lines.  Second, although there is heterogeneity in terms of the markets and resources of 
                                                 
20 The estimate of world passenger traffic used here is taken from Baker (2001).  Individually, these databases 
contain information on more than 75 carriers, but I still had to reduce the sample size due to missing data on certain 
variables of interest for certain carriers.  Whenever feasible, I supplemented missing data with information obtained 
through Nexis-Lexis.  I excluded carriers that, over the whole period, were fully owned by another airline carrier.  
However, some mergers and full acquisitions occurred especially in the last year.  Thus, in 2000 TWA was acquired 
by American Airlines, Canadian Airlines by Air Canada, and European carriers AOM and Air Liberte (jointly with 
Air Littoral) merged.   
21 I disregard agreements that were pending in a given year, and focus on passenger agreements only (i.e., exclusive 
cargo agreements are not included in the sample.)  Sometimes, a survey at year t indicates that an alliance resumed 
in year t – n, but there is no reference to that alliance in the t – n survey.  Unless the latter indicates that the alliance 
is pending at t – n, I consider that the alliance was already in place in that period.  I also ignore ties exclusively 
based on common computer reservation systems, which are considered to be regional in nature (Hanlon, 1999; 
Pustay, 1992).      21
individual airlines, air transportation technology is fairly standardized, which facilitates cross-
comparisons (Oum and Yu, 1998; Park and Martin, 2001).  Third, in the period under analysis 
several explicit constellations were formed and the pattern of interfirm linkages suggests several 
implicit groups, which allows for their comparative assessment. 
Constellation membership: implicit vs. explicit groups 
Following previous work (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 
2001; Walker, 1988), I adopt a clustering approach to demarcating the boundaries of implicit 
constellations, based on the matrix of bilateral ties among carriers in the sample.  I employ a 
clustering algorithm based on tabu search optimization (Glover, 1989), which is available in the 
software UCINET 5.0 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 1999).  An advantage of this algorithm is 
that it finds groups given a certain pre-specified number of partitions, independent of the 
clustering configurations found with fewer partitions.  Thus, it does not present the critical 
shortcoming of conventional hierarchical clustering algorithms, where a partition “made at one 
of the early stages of the analysis cannot be undone at a later stage” (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994: 385).  This is a restriction imposed by hierarchical clustering algorithms, rather than 
necessarily a feature of the data.
22  Basically, the clustering algorithm maximizes a “fit” function 
based on the average “proximity” of group members defined in terms of the existence of bilateral 
ties to one another, given a pre-specified number of groups or partitions.  Thus, the algorithm has 
a clear rule for optimizing the composition of groups, which is somewhat obscure in other 
clustering methods (Lawless and Anderson, 1996). 
To create a matrix of interfirm linkages, I simply consider that there is a linkage between two 
firms (coded 1) when they have either a bilateral alliance or an ownership relation (i.e., when at 
least one of the carriers has an equity stake in the other carrier).  Otherwise, I consider that there 
is no linkage (coded 0).
23  Such a matrix is constructed for every year in the sample.  Prior to the 
                                                 
22 The hierarchical clustering algorithm CONCOR has still another major drawback: it promotes successive splits of 
existing sets in exactly two new subsets.  Again, such binary partitions may not be a feature of the data in hand 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 380). 
23 Alternatively, I could consider the “strength” of a tie between two carriers based on the nature of their 
relationship; for instance, I could attach a higher score for linkages involving an ownership relation (e.g. Nohria and   22
application of the optimization algorithm, I first perform a visual inspection of the overall 
network, to find carriers that either do not have ties to the carriers in the sample or that have only 
isolated, pair-wise ties.  I drop such carriers from the sample prior to the clustering analysis (e.g. 
Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001).  Then I run the algorithm a couple of times to find out 
carriers that are classified into particular groups, but that do not show ties to any member of such 
groups.  Since this suggests that such actors do not have a clear pattern of membership, I also 
drop them from the sample prior to the final analysis.  Although tabu search greatly increases the 
likelihood that a global maximum will be found (Lawless and Anderson, 1996), the procedure 
may in some cases get trapped into a local maximum or stop before superior solutions are found.  
In an attempt to avoid this, I run the algorithm five times and choose the clustering configuration 
that yields the highest value of the “fit” function.
24   
Any clustering algorithm, however, has an important drawback: there is a lot of subjectivity 
in choosing the “ideal” number of partitions (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990; Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994).  In the present study, I choose 5 partitions for two main reasons.  First, in the last 
year of the sample (2000), there were 5 explicit constellations in place.  Thus, if I follow the 
conjecture, discussed earlier, that implicit constellations may be either precursors of explicit 
groups or “expanded” versions of such groups when they are in place, then it makes sense to find 
a clustering pattern that has some correspondence to the eventual configuration of explicit 
constellations.  Second, transatlantic routes between Europe and the United States are considered 
to be a key target for global airline alliances.
25  Thus, it is natural to assume that key competing 
U.S. carriers will be central players in each group.  In my sample, four U.S. carriers can be 
considered key international players: American Airlines, Delta, Northwest Airlines, and United 
                                                                                                                                                             
Garcia-Pont, 1991; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt, 2000).  In the present context, this procedure is problematic 
since in some cases carriers have equity stakes in other firms but there is no publicly announced bilateral alliance 
involving, for instance, codesharing.  To avoid unjustified assumptions guiding differential coding schemes, I opt for 
the simple criterion described before.    
24 In some cases, even after eliminating some carriers prior to the actual optimization runs, the procedure groups 
together some carriers that do not have direct ties, or that show only pair-wise, isolated ties.  I again drop such 
carriers from the composition of the final groups. 
25 As mentioned by an airline executive, “some 80 per cent of the benefits from any of the global alliances come on 
the transatlantic” (quoted in Odell and Spiegel, 2002).   23
Airlines, thus suggesting at least 4 constellations.
26  Adding an apparent cluster of European 
carriers led by Swissair results in 5 groupings.      
The demarcation of the boundaries of explicit constellations, by contrast, is straightforward: 
it is simply based on public announcements of carriers’ membership in constellations, as well as 
(if this is the case) their departure from those groups, as published in the magazine Airline 
Business and other sources obtained through Nexis-Lexis.
27     
Dependent variable 
I employ carriers’ passenger load factor as a performance measure, which serves as the 
dependent variable in this study.  The load factor is a measure of aircraft capacity utilization.  
More precisely, it is the ratio of carrier i’s total traffic, measured in revenue passenger kilometers 
(RPK), to its overall traffic capacity, measured in available seat kilometers (ASK), at year t (%).  
This corresponds to the variable LoadFactorit.  The main advantage of this measure is that it is a 
simple and standard way in the industry to compare the performance of airlines.  Its main 
disadvantage is that it ignores the role of non-passenger sources of revenue and operational 
inputs besides aircraft capacity, such as labor (Schefczyk, 1993).  Previous research has found, 
however, that a carrier’s load factor is significantly related to its financial performance (e.g. 
Behn and Riley Jr., 1999; Morrison and Winston, 1995).    
Independent variables 
Constellation-specific attributes 
Size.  I measure the size of the aggregated customer base of the constellation using the 
variable TotTraffict(Cj), which corresponds to the total scheduled passenger traffic (sum of 
individual billion RPKs) of constellation Cj at year t.  To avoid a spurious correlation between 
                                                 
26 The other carriers in the sample are less significant international players.  Alaska Airlines, America West, and US 
Airways are mostly domestic carriers.  TWA was acquired by American Airlines in 2000.  Continental Airlines, in 
turn, has an extensive agreement with Northwest Airlines.   
27 I assume that a carrier is a member of an explicit constellation in a given year if it announced its association to the 
group in the first half of that year, i.e., between January and June.  If an explicit constellation is dissolved in a given 
year, I assume that the group is in place in that year if the termination occurs in the second half of that year.   24
this variable and the size of a carrier’s individual customer base, for each carrier I exclude from 
this variable the carrier’s total passenger traffic.
28          
Resource diversity.  Based on the discussion in the previous section, an important resource in 
the airline industry is the infrastructure in foreign cities, since there are regulatory barriers for 
carriers to establish international hubs.  Thus, the constellation will exhibit diversity regarding 
this resource when members are positioned in distant cities/hubs, which expands the possibilities 
for connections.  By contrast, similar or proximate hubs will more likely be substitutes than 
complements.  Based on this idea, I define the variable dik as the distance (in 1,000 kilometers) 
between the cities where the main hubs of carriers i and k ∈ Cj, are located.  The main hub of a 
carrier is defined as the city which, for that particular carrier, shows the highest number of 
departing connections to other cities as evidenced by the Traffic by Flight Stage database.
29  The 
measure of diversity within constellation Cj with respect to the availability of distinct cities/hubs 
at year t, labeled DiversCityt(Cj), is equal to [∑i∑k<i dik]/[½mt(Cj)(mt(Cj) – 1)], where mt(Cj) is the 
number of members of constellation Cj at year t.  This measure gives the average distance 
between the main hubs of all carrier-pairs within the constellation.  If all carriers belong to 
different but close countries, the value of DiversCityt(Cj) is likely to be small.  Its value is largest 
when carriers belong to different and distant countries, i.e., when their headquarters are 
“scattered” around the globe.   
The discussion in the previous section also suggests that resource diversity in airline 
constellations depends on whether some members specialize in small, domestic markets, while 
other members specialize in large markets with a broad range of international routes.  Clougherty 
(2002) shows that a large domestic network can improve a carrier’s competitive position in 
international markets.  Based on this idea, I also assess diversity based on the international  
                                                 
28 This variable, as well as the other constellation-related variables discussed below, is measured twice considering 
the composition of a carrier’s constellation as defined both implicitly and explicitly. 
29 For few carriers, the classification of certain cities as main hubs, as defined before, varies from period to period—
possibly because those carriers operate through multiple international hubs.  For such carriers, I consider the hub 
that most frequently presented the highest number of departing connections over all the years in the sample.  
However, this choice should not strongly affect the measure because multiple hubs are in the same country and 
hence their distance to other cities in different countries tends to be similar.      25
positioning of constellation members defined as the percentage of their total passenger traffic 
(RPK) at year t coming from international traffic.  Thus, the variable DiversIntPosit(Cj) 
measures the standard deviation of individual carriers’ international positioning for members of 
constellation Cj at year t.  A high value of this variable indicates that the constellation has a mix 
of carriers specializing in international and domestic routes.  
Density of bilateral ties.  The variable Densityt(Cj) measures the density of the network of 
bilateral ties within constellation j at year t, which is simply the observed number of existing ties 
relative to the total possible number of ties between members.
30    
Member-specific attributes  
Relative size.  A carrier’s relative size within its constellation is measured by the variable 
RelCapacityit(Cj), which refers to the ratio of carrier i’s passenger available seat capacity (ASK) 
to the total capacity of its constellation, Cj, at year t. 
Dominance of critical resources.  As previously discussed, foreign hubs are fundamental 
resources in global airline constellations, and they will be relatively more critical when they 
receive traffic from several other hubs.  Consider, for instance, the hypothetical hub-and-spoke 
route network depicted in Figure 2.  Hub H2 is very important in this network because it receives 
traffic directly from three other hubs (H1, H3 and H4) and indirectly through their spokes.  
Intuitively, this is because hub H2 is “in between” those other points and thus is expected to 
receive a large fraction of the overall flow of passengers coming from and going to other hubs 
and spokes.  This suggests the use of the standardized betweenness centrality measure in network 
analysis (Freeman, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) to indicate the importance of each city in 
receiving traffic from the constellation’s route network.
31  Cities with large betweenness 
centrality scores are likely to be central hubs in the international route network, whereas cities 
                                                 
30  Formally, suppose that a constellation Cj with mt(Cj) members shows bt(Cj) pair-wise ties at year t.  Then 
Density(Cj) will be equal to bt(Cj)/[½mt(Cj)(mt(Cj)– 1)] (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
31  Suppose guv is the number of geodesics (shortest paths) linking two cites u and v, and guv(k) the number of 
geodesics linking the two cities that contain city k.  Then the betweenness centrality measure of city k is defined by 
∑v < u guv(k)guv  where k ≠ u, v.  The standardized measure corresponds to this value divided by the number of all 
possible city-pairs not including city k, i.e., ½(c – 1)(c – 2), where c is the total number of cities.    26
with low scores are likely to be either local hubs or spokes.  In the network of Figure 2, H2 has 
indeed the largest standardized score (70.91), followed by H1 (61.82), and then H3 and H4 
(34.55).  The betweenness centrality of the other nodes (spokes) is zero.  Within this perspective, 
using information from the Traffic by Flight Stage database, for each year I first construct a 
matrix of global city-pairs where each entry is coded 1 if there is a flight departing from a city 
(row) to another city (column) offered by at least one member of a particular constellation Cj at 
year t.  Based on this matrix, I use the software UCINET 5.0 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 
1999) to compute the standardized betweenness centrality score of each city k, denoted wkt(Cj). 
<Figure 2 around here> 
The next step is to measure how carriers dominate such critical hubs.  Still using ICAO’s On-
Flight Origin and Destination statistics, I compute for each city-pair k the number of carrier-
routes departing from that city and offered by all carriers in the industry, belonging or not to the 
constellation, at year t.
32  I then define pikt as the proportion of all carrier-routes from city k 
serviced by carrier i at year t.  This provides an indication of the extent to which a carrier 
dominates the traffic involving a particular city.  The final measure, denoted as DomHubit(Cj), is 
equal to the sum ∑k wkt(Cj)pikt, where k indexes all cities belonging to the route network of the 
constellation.  Intuitively, this measure indicates a carrier’s dominance of the traffic (in terms of 
route counts) involving cities in the network of the constellation weighted by the relative 
importance or criticality of those cities in terms of traffic aggregation.
33 
Bilateral ties to firms outside the constellation.  The variable OutsideTieit(Cj) is the 
proportion of carrier i’s total bilateral ties (i.e., to any firm in the sample) that are to carriers not 
                                                 
32  For instance, if a city is connected to only one city in the route network, and the connection is serviced by two 
carriers, then the number of carrier-routes involving that city is 2.  
33  Ideally, one should use information on the individual traffic of city-pair routes to compute this measure.  
However, the Traffic by Flight Stage database does not contain traffic information for all routes surveyed.  Instead 
of disregarding routes for which data on traffic are missing, which would for some carriers discard information on 
their entire route networks, I opt to use instead a rough assessment of carriers’ relative traffic based on route counts, 
as described before.  Despite its limitations, the use of the Traffic by Flight Stage database is not without precedent 
in the airline industry literature (e.g. Clougherty, 2002; Park and Zhang, 2000).        27
belonging to its constellation, Cj, at year t.  Thus, it measures the extent to which carrier i has 
external options in terms of relationships with firms outside its constellation. 
Bilateral ties to other constellation members.  The variable InsideTieit(Cj) is the proportion of 
members of constellation Cj to which carrier i ∈ Cj has bilateral ties at t.         
Control variables 
Carrier- specific attributes.  As usual in studies assessing determinants of firm performance, 
I employ several controls related to firm size.  Capacityit, Employeesit, and Routesit measure 
respectively carrier i’s passenger seat capacity (billion ASK), number of employees (in 
thousands), and number of serviced international routes (in thousands, according to the Traffic by 
Flight Stage database) at year t.  Since the existence of cargo activity has been shown to affect a 
carrier’s performance (Oum and Yu, 1998), I also include the variable Cargoit, which measures 
the ratio of carrier i’s cargo flights (measured in billion RTK, revenue tonne kilometers) to its 
number of employees (in thousands) at year t.  Finally, to control for possible differences in 
terms of carriers’ experience in the industry, I employ the variable Ageit, which indicates the time 
elapsed, at t, since the carrier’s founding.     
“Ego” network.  Variables related to constellation membership are likely to be correlated 
with the structure of carriers’ “ego” networks, defined as the set of firms to which they are 
directly tied.  Failure to control for this fact may generate a spurious correlation between 
constellation-related variables and performance: carriers may benefit from their own network of 
direct ties rather than from membership in constellations.  Thus, I include the variables EgoTiesit 
and EgoTrafficit, which measure respectively carrier i’s total number of bilateral ties to other 
firms in the sample, and the sum of the individual traffic (billion RPKs) of those firms to which 
carrier i is directly tied at year t. 
Multimarket contact.  Multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion because a particular firm 
can retaliate against another firm’s competitive hostility in a certain market through an escalation 
of competition in other shared markets (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Karnani and Wernerfelt, 
1985).  In the present study, controlling for multimarket contact is important because, as shown   28
by Gimeno and Woo (1996), it may be correlated with resource similarity.  Thus, failure to 
control for multimarket contact may bias the analysis of the impact on a firm’s resource profile 
and performance.
34  Studies of multimarket contact in the airline industry have considered city-
pair routes as the relevant markets or points of contact.  Thus, using the Traffic by Flight Stage 
database, I first compute the variable rikt representing the number of international city-pair routes 
jointly serviced by two carriers i and k (i ≠ k) at year t.  For a certain carrier i belonging to a 
constellation Cj, and considering all other constellation members k ∈ Cj, I then compute the 
value (∑k rikt)/(mt(Cj) – 1), where mt(Cj) is the number of members of constellation Cj at year t.  
The resulting measure, denoted Contactit(Cj), represents the average number of international 
route contacts between carrier i and other members of its constellations.  Since this is essentially 
a member-specific variable, I also create a group-level measure called GrContactt(Cj), which is 
simply the mean of Contactit(Cj) for all i ∈ Cj, i.e., the average number of international route 
contacts among all group members. 
Country-specific controls.  I employ a set of country-specific variables to control for time-
varying effects related to carriers’ domestic markets, which are likely to affect their performance: 
the country’s per capita GDP (GDPCapit, 1,000 US$), GDP percent growth (GDPGrowit), and 
population (Popit, billion inhabitants).  This information is obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database.     
Year-specific controls.  Finally, I create a set of dummy variables representing each year in 
the observation window, denoted as Year(t), in order to control for temporal effects such as 
variations in economic and regulatory conditions over time, as well as trends in the pattern of 
interfirm alliances. 
                                                 
34 Namely, even if a firm controls non-critical resources within the group, it may not suffer intense competition from 
other members if they compete in several markets and, for this reason, tacitly collude.  Although multimarket 
contact has been largely studied in terms of pricing decisions (e.g. Evans and Kessides, 1994; Gimeno and Woo, 
1996), it may also influence the extent to which individual demand or capacity is affected by competitive rivalry 
(Gimeno, 1999), which in turn may affect the performance measure used in this study (load factor).     29
Table 2 lists all the variables described above.  Since separate regressions are run for explicit 
and implicit constellations, summary statistics of those variables are presented separately for 
each case—respectively, Tables 3 and 4.
35 
<Tables 2, 3 and 4 around here> 
Method 
To estimate equation (1), I use a linear specification for the function mapping constellation- 
(x(Cj)) and member-specific attributes (zi(Cj)) onto firm performance (yit): π(x(Cj), zi(Cj)) = 
xt(Cj)β + zit(Cj)γ.  I assume additionally that the carrier-specific term fi takes the form fi = witδ + 
τt + eit, where wit is a vector of firm-specific control variables, τt denotes year-specific effects, 
and eit is an error term.  Following Finkel’s (1995) recommendation, I also add the lagged value 
of the performance variable, yit–1, as an explanatory term to control for adjustment processes in 
panel settings.
36  Thus, (1) is rewritten as 
(3) yit = xt(Cj)β + zit(Cj)γ + witδ + τt + λyit–1 + eit. 
This equation is estimated twice: in the first regression, Cj corresponds to carrier i’s implicit 
group; in the second, it corresponds to carrier i’s explicit group (if any).   With respect to the 
error term eit, I initially employ a standard random-effects specification by assuming that eit = αi 
+ εit where αi is a time-invariant, firm-specific term, and εit is a time-varying error term, and that 
both terms are normally distributed and uncorrelated with the independent variables.  The model 
is estimated via generalized least squares (GLS). 
However, estimating the model above has two sorts of problems.  First, not all firms in the 
sample belong to an explicit constellation.  Since firms self-select whether they will join an 
explicit constellation or not, unobserved firm-specific factors (such as competencies to form and 
formalize multilateral agreements) may cause systematic performance differences conditional on 
a firm having chosen a particular explicit constellation, and bias the estimates as a result.  To test 
                                                 
35 The table reveals no critical problem of multicollinearity involving the key (constellation-related) explanatory 
variables.  Capacityit and Employeesit are highly correlated but they are essentially controls. 
36 This is particularly important here since the dependent variable here is the load factor, which crucially depends on 
how carriers adjust their seat capacity to changing traffic conditions.   30
for the presence of selectivity bias, I employ the now-standard Heckman (1979) two-stage 
approach.  In the first stage, considering all firms in the sample, I run a Probit model where the 
dependent variable (Explit) is binary and codes whether the firm belongs to any explicit 
constellation at t or not.  As explanatory variables, I use all control variables described before 
(except for the multimarket contact controls, which are not observed for non-members of explicit 
constellations) and a set of instrumental variables.  The first instrument, Explit-1, is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if carrier i was a member of any explicit constellation in the previous year and 0 
otherwise.  Participation in explicit constellations is likely to involve sunk investments in 
contractual procedures, brand name, and information technology, which tend to increase the 
likelihood that firms will continue participating in such groups.  The second instrument, 
TiesExplicitit, measures the proportion of carrier i’s bilateral ties at t that are to carriers belonging 
to any explicit constellation in that period.  Members of an explicit group may attempt to lure 
new firms to which they have bilateral ties (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 66).  After including all 
control variables, these instruments are uncorrelated with the performance variable, load factor.  
Taking the sub-sample of members of any explicit constellation in a given year, I next run an 
OLS regression of LoadFactorit on the inverse Mills ratio resulting from the Probit regression 
plus the set of controls (except for the multimarket contact variables, which are not included in 
the Probit equation).
37 
The second problem with the random-effects specification of (3) is that constellation- (x(Cj)) 
and member-specific attributes (zi(Cj)) may be endogenous.  Namely, unobserved firm-specific 
attributes may be correlated with both performance and those explanatory variables.  For 
instance, some firms may have superior competence not only to manage airline operations but 
also to select partners, which may in turn influence group attributes (e.g., total traffic).  Ideally, if 
endogeneity is present, one should model (3) as a system of equations using instruments to 
                                                 
37 Some firms are not included in the regressions for implicit groups in cases where the clustering algorithm fails to 
find a stable pattern of membership for those firms in a given year.  Since this is a consequence of the clustering 
algorithm rather than an issue of self-selection, I do not employ the Heckman two-stage approach in regressions for 
implicit constellations.   31
identify the process generating all constellation- and member-specific attributes.  However, I was 
unable to specify such a model due to the lack of enough satisfactory instruments.  In an attempt 
to assess the robustness of the results, I employ alternatively a standard fixed-effects 
specification by removing within-carrier means, which satisfactorily removes fixed carrier-
specific unobserved heterogeneity (αi).
38  However, estimating a dynamic model like (3) with 
fixed effects may generate inconsistent estimates due to the use of the lagged dependent variable 
as an explanatory term, as discussed by Nickell (1981).  To avoid this effect, I drop the lagged 
dependent variable when using fixed effects.
39     
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Characterization of implicit and explicit constellations 
Table 5 shows the evolution and the composition of explicit constellations.  The period under 
analysis in this study has witnessed the progressive emergence of several constellations 
involving key international players, and the dissolution of some groups.  In general, firms do not 
belong to more than one explicit constellation in a given year.  There are some exceptions, 
though membership in more than one group appears to be an unstable pattern.  For instance, 
Delta and Swissair formed the Atlantic Excellence group in 1997 while still members of the 
Global Excellence group with Singapore Airlines, but the latter soon departed and later joined 
the Star Alliance.  Also, Swissair, Austrian Airlines and Sabena were members of two groups in 
1998 and 1999, Atlantic Excellence (with Delta) and Qualiflyer (with other European carriers).  
But the Atlantic Excellence group was soon dissolved: Delta exited in 1999 and created another 
group, SkyTeam, with another major international player, Air France, while Austrian Airlines 
later switched to the Star Alliance.  In instances where a firm belongs to two constellations in a 
                                                 
38 To be sure, there might be some source of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity that is not eliminated with fixed 
effects.  I believe, however, that any unobserved factor that may cause endogeneity bias—e.g., competencies to form 
and manage alliances—should be fairly fixed in the sample, especially because the observation window is not long.     
39 Gimeno (1999) adopts instead an instrumental variable approach by computing first differences of the lagged 
dependent variable and then using several lags as instruments.  This procedure is problematic here due to the short 
temporal window of the panel.   32
given year, I consider that the composition of its group is the union of the set of firms belonging 
to each constellation. 
<Table 5 around here> 
Table 6 presents the composition of implicit constellations, as determined by the tabu search 
clustering algorithm, and density tables for each year: diagonal entries represent the density of 
bilateral ties among firms within each group (i.e., variable Densityt(Cj)), whereas off-diagonal 
entries represent the density of bilateral ties among firms belonging to different groups.  In all 
cases, diagonal values are clearly higher than off-diagonal values, thus suggesting that the 
algorithm is capturing the operational definition of an implicit constellation as a cluster of firms 
that have more extensive ties to one another than to firms outside the group.  The composition of 
most implicit constellations changes markedly from period to period, in part because bilateral 
agreements are terminated and formed at a high rate in the industry (Baker, 2001).  There also 
appears to be some correspondence between the composition of implicit groups and the evolving 
explicit groups, especially in the last years in the observation window, as depicted in Figure 3.
40  
This lends some support to the idea that implicit groups in some cases represent “expanded” 
versions of explicit constellations.
41   
<Table 6 around here> 
<Figure 3 around here> 
Constellation membership and performance  
Table 7 shows the results of the regressions relating constellation membership to firm 
performance.  Models (1), (2) and (3) refer to the sample of firms belonging to explicit 
constellations; all models are significant (p < 0.001).  The random-effects model (1), estimated 
via GLS, provides support for Hypothesis 1: an increase in the aggregated customer base of the 
                                                 
40 The graph was drawn using the software KrackPlot 3.0 (Krackhardt, Blythe, and McGrath, 1994). 
41 It is difficult to ascertain whether implicit groups influence the formation of explicit groups or vice-versa; it may 
be the case that both effects jointly occur.  Based on Tables 5 and 6, it seems that some key members of some 
clusters (such as American Airlines/British Airways/Quantas and KLM/Northwest) later formalized their agreement.  
In other cases, the formation of implicit groups appears to be simultaneous to or resulting from the emergence of 
explicit groups, as in the case of the Star Alliance.  A detailed analysis of the determinants of constellation 
formation, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.   33
constellation (TotTraffict(Cj)) significantly increase members’ performance (p = 0.049).
42  A 
carrier is expected to have an increase in its load factor by almost 1 percentage point if the traffic 
brought by other constellation members increases by 100 billion RPKs.  The other constellation-
specific attributes are insignificant, thus providing no support for Hypotheses 2 and 3: the 
resource diversity and the density of bilateral ties within explicit constellations do not have a 
significant effect on performance.  Likewise, all member-specific attributes are insignificant, 
thus providing no support for Hypotheses 4 to 7: the relative position of firms within explicit 
constellations, at least with respect to the attributes employed in this study, does not explain 
interfirm performance differences. 
<Table 7 around here> 
To test for the presence of selectivity bias involving the sub-sample of explicit constellations, 
model (2) is a two-stage Heckman model where the first stage (a) estimates, via Probit, the 
decision to join an explicit constellation, and the second (b) is the OLS performance regression.  
For the first stage, all instruments are significant: being part of an explicit constellation at t –1 
(PastExplicitit) and holding a large proportion of bilateral ties to members of existing explicit 
constellations (TiesExplicitit) increases the likelihood of being part of an explicit constellation at 
t.  However, when included in the OLS regression, the resulting inverse Mills ratio (InvMillsit) is 
insignificant, thus suggesting that selectivity bias is not a matter of concern here.      
Model (3) is the fixed-effects version of model (1).  Support for Hypothesis 1 is robust to the 
fixed effects specification: TotTraffict(Cj) remains significantly related to performance (p = 
0.0365).  Although the variable measuring hub diversity (DiversHubt(Cj)) is significant (p = 
0.002), it has a sign that is the opposite of what is predicted in Hypothesis 2: diversity appears to 
reduce, rather than increase performance.  A 1,000 km increase in the average distance between 
members’ main hubs decreases load factors by 0.73 percentage points.  This result appears to 
support opposite arguments, discussed earlier, that diversity makes it more difficult for firms to 
                                                 
42 Tests for hypothesized effects are one-tailed.   34
integrate their resources and cooperate.  For instance, having firms from distant locations in the 
group may increase their difficulty in understanding country-specific conditions and monitoring 
one another.  It is also possible that TotTraffict(Cj) may be picking part of the effect of increased 
hub diversity.  Thus, even though hub diversity has a direct negative effect on performance, it 
may have an indirect positive effect by increasing the aggregated traffic of the constellation due 
to the possibility to exploit complementarities.  Some support for this conjecture is found by 
noting in Table 3 that DiversHubt(Cj) and TotTraffict(Cj) have a significant and positive 
correlation, around 0.66 (p < 0.001).  Other constellation-specific variables and all member-
specific variables remain insignificant in the fixed-effects specification. 
Table 7 also presents the results of regressions including variables related to implicit 
constellations; all models, (4) and (5), are significant (p < 0.001).  Model (4) corresponds to 
random-effects estimates.  No constellation-specific attribute is significant, thus providing no 
support for Hypotheses 1 to 3: general attributes of implicit constellations apparently do not 
explain interfirm performance differences.  However, several member-specific attributes are 
significant.  RelCapacityit(Cj), which measures a carrier’s capacity relative to the total capacity 
of its group, is marginally significant (p = 0.088), thus providing moderate support for 
Hypothesis 4: larger members appear to outperform smaller members.  Hypothesis 5 is not 
supported: the measure of hub dominance adopted in this study, which is a proxy for the control 
of critical resources, is unrelated to firm performance.  The remaining member-specific 
attributes, related to the structure of a carrier’s bilateral ties, are strongly significant.  A 10 
percent increase in the proportion of a member’s bilateral ties that are to firms outside its 
constellation (OutsideTieit(Cj)) enhances its load factor by 0.33 percentage points (p < 0.001), 
thereby lending support to Hypothesis 6.  Also, a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of members to which a certain firm holds bilateral ties (InsideTieit(Cj)) increases that firm’s load 
factor by around 0.62 percentage points (p = 0.003), thus supporting Hypothesis 7.  Notice that 
the effect of a firm’s total number of bilateral ties (EgoTiesit), which is used as a control variable, 
is significant but negative (p = 0.001).  These results suggest that superior performance in the   35
context of implicit constellations is not brought by an increase in bilateral ties per se.  Rather, it 
is driven by a balance between within-group ties—which possibly grant a member enhanced 
influence and access to group resources—and ties to firms outside the group—which possibly 
yield that member external options. 
However, as model (5) shows, these results are not robust to a fixed-effects specification.  No 
constellation- or member-specific variable is significant in this case.  This may be due to two 
causes.  First, it may be a consequence of fixed-effects estimation, which is likely to reduce 
within-firm heterogeneity—more critical in the case of member-specific variables—and magnify 
the problem of attenuation bias due to measurement error (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).  Notice 
that variables related to implicit constellations are inherently measured with error due to the 
rather subjective boundaries of those groups.  The second possible cause may be due to the fact 
that the lagged dependent variable, LoadFactorit-1, is not included in the fixed-effects models.  
Indeed, across all random-effects models this variable is always strongly significant (p < 0.001), 
thus suggesting that adjustment processes do matter in the case of load factors.  If I include the 
lagged dependent variable in the fixed-effects model, then InsideTieit(Cj) regains statistical 
significance (p = 0.038), although both RelCapacityit(Cj) and OutsideTieit(Cj) remain 
insignificant.                
The effect of group organization 
The final set of hypotheses, 8 and 9, assert that the effects of constellation- and member-
specific variables are contingent on group organization.  The results of the random-effects 
models (1) and (4) unambiguously support those hypotheses.  Namely, constellation-specific 
attributes are only significant and hence explain interfirm performance differences when they are 
related to explicit constellations, which is aligned with Hypothesis 8.  Member-specific 
attributes, by contrast, are only significant in the regression for implicit constellations, thereby 
supporting Hypothesis 9.  Thus, while explicit constellations appear to augment the effect of 
constellation-specific attributes on firm performance, in implicit constellations the effect of 
member-specific attributes appears to be more pronounced.  Support for the impact of group   36
organization on the role of constellation-specific attributes (Hypothesis 8) is robust to the fixed-
effects specification.  But member-specific attributes are insignificant in both models (3) and (5), 
thereby failing to provide robust support for Hypothesis 9.  However, the fact that InsideTieit(Cj) 
becomes significant in the fixed-effects model when that lagged dependent variable is introduced 




This study moves beyond research focusing on isolated networks or the web of alliances 
surrounding particular firms and shows that there is value in examining the impact of 
membership in competing constellations.  Although past research has studied competing 
constellations, the performance implications of membership in those groups remains a rather 
unexplored topic.  Following Gomes-Casseres (1994), I outline sources of membership benefits 
and offer novel hypotheses about how group organization—i.e., whether the constellation is 
explicit (based on formal, multilateral agreements) or implicit (informal clusters based on the 
structure of bilateral ties among firms)—affects those sources.  Namely, I propose that generic 
group characteristics, which determine the total value generated by the group, contribute more to 
explaining interfirm performance differences in explicit constellations than in implicit ones.   
However, this effect is reversed in the case of member-specific attributes, which allow firms to 
better capture differential membership benefits within the same group.  Thus, both the total value 
created in constellations and how this value is distributed among members are contingent on 
patterns of group organization.  Evidence from the global airline industry supports this theory.  
This study also has important managerial implications.  Faced with competing constellations, 
managers would like to know the performance implications of partnering with a given group of 
firms.  In other words, managers should decide not only whether they should join a constellation, 
but also which constellation to join.  The results presented here show that this decision does 
matter.  Thus, when considering alternative explicit constellations, managers should pay extra   37
attention to general attributes of those groups that are likely to increase the total value generated 
by the alliance, such as the size of the constellation’s aggregated customer base.  By contrast, 
when considering alternative implicit constellations, managers should carefully consider the 
relative position of the firm within its group, such as its “centrality” based on bilateral ties to 
several other members, which critically define the firm’s ability to reap superior membership 
benefits.           
Limitations and possible extensions  
This study has important limitations.  First, its results are confined to a single industry and 
thus may not be generalizable to other contexts.  Many variables under analysis here are 
industry-specific, although they relate to general theoretical concepts.  Moreover, the 
international traffic in the airline industry is also heavily regulated, which makes the use of 
alliances the only way for global airlines to benefit from foreign resources.  In other industry 
contexts, firms may expand their networks and develop their own resources internally, i.e., by 
increasing the size and scope of their operations.  I believe, however, that the theoretical 
framework and the results presented here have applicability in other contexts for several reasons.  
Even in situations where firms are free to acquire foreign resources, the internalization of large 
networks within a single firm is either unfeasible or excessively costly (Richardson, 1972).  
Some resources, such as knowledge of local markets or competencies in specific technical fields 
are difficult to replicate because they oftentimes result from learning-by-doing processes and 
demand complex, interdependent skills (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990).  
Acquiring existing firms holding such resources is likely to reduce incentives for innovation, as 
they will not be subject to market-based selection pressures (Kogut, 2000).  For this reason, 
Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) claim that constellations are crucial in global contexts precisely 
because firms cannot hope to fully control and have access to local resources.  Furthermore, even 
in cases where regulation does not prevent the acquisition of foreign resources, firms may be 
reluctant to do so if they perceive a risk that such investments will be expropriated by 
discretionary local governments (Henisz, 2000).  Thus, there are circumstances where the   38
expansion of networks internally is difficult, and thus membership in constellations becomes an 
important organizational decision.  However, an assessment of the benefits of constellation 
membership in other industries, particularly in contexts where firms have more freedom to 
choose alternative organizational modes, is certainly warranted.  
Second, the demarcation of the boundaries of implicit constellations is inherently associated 
with error, which may cause problems in comparing explicit and implicit groups.  Of course, this 
problem is present in any study assessing the boundaries of organizational forms that are not 
readily observable (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).  Thus, the empirical results involving implicit 
constellations must be taken with caution.  For instance, results appear to be sensitive to the 
chosen number of partitions.  Although the tabu search optimization algorithm employed here is 
an improvement over usual methods such as hierarchical clustering, there is a clear need to 
define a general criterion for choosing an optimal number of partitions based on the network of 
bilateral ties.  A possible way to do this is to consider the operational definition of an implicit 
constellation: a set of firms that have more ties to one another than to firms outside the group.  
Note that, by increasing the number of partitions, it is likely that the density of within-group ties 
will increase, but at the expense of an increase in the proportion of ties that are to firms outside 
the group (Bock and Husain, 1950).  A “fit” function that captures this tradeoff can be 
incorporated in the tabu search algorithm and guide the optimization of both the composition of 
groups and the number of partitions.
43  
Third, the performance measure employed here, load factor, ignores sources of costs other 
than capacity and focuses on short-term results.  Thus, I cannot tell whether the positive 
externalities attained from constellation membership outweigh the costs to form and manage 
those groups.  This is particularly critical in the case of explicit constellations, since firms may 
incur substantial expenses to negotiate agreements, establish committees to oversee the affairs of 
                                                 
43 Lawless and Anderson (1996) incorporate an objective decision rule in the tabu search algorithm to define an 
optimal number and composition of clusters.  But since they study strategic groups rather than networks, their 
decision rule is not based on the definition of implicit groups presented above.     39
the group, create common transacting interfaces, and so on.  Studies that evaluate sources of 
costs associated with constellation membership are needed.
44 
Fourth, I cannot ascertain what are the particular mechanisms that are driving the results 
presented here, even when results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.  For instance, 
do explicit constellations magnify the effect of group-level attributes on performance because 
multilateral agreements allow for improved coordination, because formalization of the agreement 
curtails opportunistic behavior, or because groups gain visibility by becoming explicit (e.g., 
through brand names)?  Do the mechanisms that create interfirm performance differences in 
constellations correspond to the processes described here, i.e., exit (bargaining) and voice?  A 
more microanalytic examination of those processes can largely contribute to our understanding 
of how constellations are organized and managed.     
Finally, this study does not consider the sustainability of benefits from constellation 
membership, in the sense proposed by Barney (1991).  As constellations lure new members over 
time, the size of the customer base and the profile of resources within each group may become 
similar to other groups (see Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991: 109-110).  If there are between-
constellation differences, members will have incentives to drag members from other 
constellations or lure new members until such differences are reduced.  The only sustainable 
source of superior performance from constellation membership may be therefore the relative 
position of firms within their constellations.  For instance, firms may benefit mostly from 
constellation membership in the long-term when they hold difficult-to-imitate resources such as 
close relationships or critical assets.  Future research should attempt to examine, using longer 
observation windows, those possible dynamic effects.              
 
                                                 
44 A possibility, which can be explored in future studies, is to use abnormal returns in event studies assessing stock 
market reactions to public announcements that a particular firm will join a certain constellation, along the lines of 
the methodology presented in Park and Martin (2001).  A potential problem in the case of global constellations is 
that not all foreign firms are publicly traded, and in several cases not even reliable accounting information is 
available.  Furthermore, even though event studies can be applied to the study of explicit constellations, whose 
membership profile is public information, their application to implicit constellations, whose boundaries are 
subjective, is likely to be problematic.      40
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Figure 3.  Implicit and explicit airline constellations in 2000 
Note:  Abbreviations of carrier names as indicated in Table 1; gray lines represent bilateral ties. 
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Table 1.  Airline carriers included in the sample 
Carrier name (abbreviation)  Traffic*  Country  Carrier name (abbreviation)  Traffic*  Country 
Aer Lingus (LIN)  8.889  Ireland  Japan Air System (JAS)  15.472  Japan 
Aeroflot (AFL)  16.557  Russia  Japan Airlines (JA)  88.999  Japan 
Aerolineas Argentinas (ARG)  11.111  Argentina  KLM Royal Dutch Airl. (KLM)  60.331  Netherlands 
Aeromexico (AMX)  14.390  Mexico  Korean Air (KOR)  40.467  South Korea 
Air Algerie (ALG)  3.051  Algeria  LanChile (LCH)  9.931  Chile 
Air Canada (AC)  44.806  Canada  Lauda Air (LAU)  4.562  Austria 
Air China (CHI)  18.116  China  Lloyd Aero Boliviano (LAB)  1.701  Bolivia 
Air France (AFR)  91.801  France  LOT Polish Airlines (LOT)  4.757  Poland 
Air-India  (IND)  12.006 India  Lufthansa  (LFH)  94.170 Germany 
Air Liberte (LIB)  4.707  France  Malaysia Airlines (MA)  37.947  Malaysia 
Air New Zealand (ANZ)  22.232  New Zealand  Malev Hungarian Airlines (MAL)  3.168  Hungary 
Alaska Airlines (ALA)  19.273  United States  Mexicana de Aviacion (MEX)  13.498  Mexico 
Alitalia (ALI)  40.618  Italy  Northwest Airlines (NW)  127.324  United States 
All Nippon Airways (ANA)  58.042  Japan Olympic  Airways  (OLY) 8.860  Greece 
America West Airlines (AW)  30.742  United States  Qantas Airways (QUA)  63.495  Australia 
American Airlines (AA)  187.542  United States  Royal Air Maroc (RAM)  7.185  Morocco 
Ansett Australia (ANS)  17.110  Australia  Royal Jordanian Airlines (RAJ)  4.207  Jordan 
AOM French Airlines (AOM)  9.248  France  Sabena (SAB)  19.379  Belgium 
Austrian Airlines (AUS)  8.799  Austria  Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)  22.647  Sweden 
Balkan Bulgarian (BAL)  0.808  Bulgaria  Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAU)  20.229 Saudi  Arabia 
British Airways (BA)  118.890  United Kingdom  Singapore Airlines (SIN)  70.795  Singapore 
British Midland (BMI)  3.837  United Kingdom  South African Airways (SAA)  19.321  South Africa 
Canadian Airlines Intern. (CAI)  23.395  Canada  Sri Lankan Airlines (SLA)  6.860  Sri Lanka 
Cathay Pacific (CP)  47.097  Hong Kong  Swissair (SWR)  34.246  Switzerland 
Continental Airlines (CO)  96.949  United States  Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR)  1.422  Syria 
Croatia Airlines (CRO)  0.644  Croatia  TAP Air Portugal (TAP)  10.385  Portugal 
Crossair  (CRS)  2.073 Switzerland  TAROM  (TAR)  2.075 Romania 
CSA Czech Airlines (CSA)  3.294  Czech Republic  Thai Airways International (TAI)  42.236  Thailand 
Cyprus Airways (CYP)  2.785  Cyprus  Trans World Airlines (TWA)  43.798  United States 
Delta Air Lines (DL)  173.411  United States  Tunisair (TUN)  2.694  Tunisia 
Egyptair (EGY)  9.086  Egypt  Turkish Airlines THY (THY)  16.492  Turkey 
El Al (EL)  14.125  Israel  Ukraine Intern. Airlines (UKR)  0.401  Ukraine 
Emirates (EMI)  19.413  Un. Arab Emirates  United Airlines (UA)  204.187  United States 
Finnair (FIN)  7.460  Finland  US Airways (USAir) (USA)  75.380  United States 
GB Airways (GB)  1.971  United Kingdom  Varig (VRG)  26.286  Brazil 
Gulf Air (GUL)  12.739  Bahrain  VASP Brazilian Airlines (VSP)  4.918  Brazil 
Iberia Airlines (IBR)  40.015  Spain  Virgin Atlantic Airways (VIR)  29.471  United Kingdom 
Iran Air (IRA)  6.229  Iran       
* Passenger traffic in 2000, billion RPK (revenue passenger kilometers), from IATA’s World Air Transport Statistics.   50
Table 2.  Description of variables 
Measure Description 
Performance   
LoadFactorit   Load factor: the ratio of carrier i’s total traffic (RPK) to its overall 
traffic capacity (ASK) at year t (%). 
Constellation-specific attributes   
TotTraffict(Cj)   Total passenger traffic (sum of members’ RPKs, billion) of 
constellation Cj at t, excluding carrier i’s individual traffic. 
DiversHubt(Cj)  The average distance (1,000 km) between the major hubs of all 
carrier-pairs within constellation Cj at t. 
DiversIntPost(Cj)   The standard deviation of individual carriers’ international 
positioning (percentage of RPK due to international traffic) for 
members of constellation Cj at t. 
Densityt(Cj)   Density of the network of bilateral ties within constellation Cj at t. 
Member-specific attributes   
RelCapacityit(Cj)    The ratio of carrier i’s passenger capacity (ASK) to the total 
capacity of its constellation Cj at t. 
DomHubit(Cj)  Roughly speaking, carrier i’s dominance of the traffic involving 
cities in the route network of constellation Cj weighted by the 
relative importance of those cities/hubs in aggregating traffic. 
InsideTieit(Cj)   Proportion of members of constellation Cj to which carrier i ∈ Cj 
has bilateral ties at t.   
OutsideTieit(Cj)  Proportion of carrier i’s bilateral ties that are to firms outside its 
constellation Cj at t.   
Control variables   
Capacityit  Carrier i’s capacity (billion ASK) at t.   
Employeesit  Carrier i’s number of employees at t (thousands).   
Routesit   Carrier i’s number of serviced routes at t (thousands).   
Cargoit  Ratio of carrier i’s cargo flight activity (RTK) to its number of 
employees (thousands) at t. 
Ageit  Time elapsed, at t, since carrier i’s founding. 
EgoTiesit  Number of direct bilateral ties of carrier i at t.   
EgoTrafficit  Aggregated traffic (billion RPK) of carriers to which carrier i has 
direct bilateral ties at t.  
Contactit(Cj)  Average number of international route contacts between carrier i 
and other members of its constellation Cj at t. 
GrContactt(Cj)  Average number of international route contacts among members 
of constellation Cj at t. 
GDPCapit,  GDP per capita of carrier i’s country at t (US$ 1,000). 
GDPGrowit  GDP growth (%) of carrier i’s country at t. 
Popit  Population (billion inhabitants) of carrier i’s country at t. 
Year(t)  Set of dummy variables coded 1 if the observation is from year t 
and 0 otherwise. 
Note:  ASK = available seat kilometers; RPK = revenue passenger kilometers. 
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Table 3.  Summary statistics: explicit groups (N = 86) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1.LoadFactorit   1 .                            
2.TotTraffict   . 1 4   1                           
3.DiversHubt  . 2 7   . 6 6   1                          
4.DiversIntPost  - . 1 6   - . 5 7   - . 4 3   1                         
5.Densityt  .17  -.35  .24  .23  1                       
6.RelCapacityit    .30  -.46  .09  .14  .51  1                      
7.DomHubit  .11  -.29  .03  .20  .42  .38  1                     
8.InsideTieit  .32  -.28  .20  .21  .70  .54  .55  1                    
9.OutsideTieit  .14  -.10  .23  .04  .40  .33  .41  .34  1                   
10.Capacityit  .32  -.14  .34  -.14  .30  .86  .26  .49  .22  1                  
11.Employeesit  .29  -.11  .33  -.21  .26  .80  .30  .47  .24  .98  1                 
12.Routesit   .11  -.02  .21  -.16  .11  .35  .71  .37  .32  .50  .53  1                
13.Cargoit  .31  .18  .33  -.07  .15  -.01  .14  .08  .07  .05  -.06  .22  1               
14.Ageit  .15  .10  .22  -.16  .20  .36  .43  .32  .41  .37  .41  .46  -.12  1              
15.EgoTiesit  .19  .05  .06  .10  .01  .15  .36  .50  .49  .24  .27  .41  -.05  .33  1             
16.EgoTrafficit  .29 .48 .42  -.15  -.05  -.12 .13 .32 .37 .05 .07 .19 .19 .24 .68  1                       
17.Contactit  .10  -.15 .19  -.29 .27 .30 .27 .19 .37 .26 .29 .30 .09 .14  -.07  -.08  1                     
18.GrContactt  .14  -.18 .15  -.16 .20 .45 .59 .37 .37 .50 .52 .70 .17 .28 .24 .07 .70  1                   
19.GDPCapit,  -.02  -.24 .04 .20 .29 .38 .47 .50 .08 .39 .36 .32 .02 .00 .31 .01 .06 .35  1                 
20.GDPGrowit  .32 .13 .21 .06 .14 .10  -.14 .14  -.06 .13 .05  -.16 .32  -.01  -.05 .20  -.17  -.13 .12  1               
21.Popit  .18  -.22 .16  -.07 .26 .83 .12 .31 .04 .86 .85 .29  -.14 .31 .03  -.17 .21 .30 .21 .02  1             
22.Year96  -.01  -.14 .22 .30 .35 .15 .15 .25 .16 .07 .02 .03 .12  -.03 .05 .01 .00 .00 .16 .02 .04  1           
23.Year97  -.05  -.09 .00  -.05 .30 .04 .06 .24 .17 .05 .05 .15 .07  -.02 .05  -.02 .47 .32 .06  -.06 .00  -.07  1         
24.Year98  -.08 -.17 -.31 -.19 -.15 -.06 -.07 -.10 -.21 -.09 -.06 -.05 -.10 -.12 -.07 -.21 -.11 -.07 -.03 -.26 -.01 -.09 -.17  1       
25.Year99  -.06  -.03 .06  -.01  -.19 .02 .01  -.16 .14 .03 .04 .04  -.07 .03  -.05  -.05 .14 .10  -.01  -.16 .02  -.11  -.22  -.28  1     
26.Year00  .19  .33  .02 -.01 -.17 -.11 -.11 -.12 -.19 -.05 -.05 -.12  .02  .11  .05  .24 -.39 -.26 -.14  .37 -.04 -.15 -.28 -.35 -.47  1   
27.LoadFactorit-1   .90 .02 .18  -.15 .10 .32 .09 .27 .10 .33 .30 .09 .26 .05 .15 .21 .14 .16  -.02 .24 .20  -.05  -.13  -.03 .09 .07  1 
Mean  70  273 7.0 .27 .60 .18 9.3 .60 .60  75  26  279 .02  57 9.2  353  11  11  23 3.5  74 .03 .12 .17 .27 .37  69 
Std. Dev.  5.4  171 3.7 .06 .22 .20 7.8 .31 .24  80  26  201 .05  20 5.4  171 5.7 8.5  10 2.8  97 .18 .32 .38 .45 .49 5.4 
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Table 4.  Summary statistics: implicit groups (N = 401) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1.LoadFactorit   1                            
2.TotTraffict   . 1 4   1                           
3.DiversHubt  . 2 6   . 6 4   1                          
4.DiversIntPost  . 1 4   . 2 6   . 3 8   1                         
5.Densityt  -.01  .49  -.06  -.41  1                       
6.RelCapacityit    .35  -.26  .01  .06  -.10  1                      
7.DomHubit  .24  -.21  -.04  .03  -.09  .56  1                     
8.InsideTieit  .17  .21  -.04  -.25  .55  .19  .20  1                    
9.OutsideTieit  .19  -.23  -.01  .20  -.30  .18  .22  -.32  1                   
10.Capacityit  .38  .09  .25  .17  .08  .85  .46  .29  .10  1                  
11.Employeesit  .35  .02  .19  .13  .06  .84  .54  .30  .11  .95  1                 
12.Routesit   .27  -.04  -.03  -.03  .11  .52  .81  .37  .15  .57  .65  1                
13.Cargoit  .23  .11  .09  .04  .08  .12  .14  .05  .03  .14  .04  .15  1               
14.Ageit  .13  -.01  -.05  .02  .09  .31  .45  .31  .03  .30  .37  .46  -.07  1              
15.EgoTiesit  .22  .16  -.10  -.25  .49  .22  .28  .81  .12  .31  .32  .47  .09  .31  1             
16.EgoTrafficit  .28 .46 .26  -.07 .47 .06 .05 .64 .06 .22 .17 .15 .16 .17 .71  1                       
17.Contactit  .03 .55 .36 .11 .20  -.05  -.05 .05  -.08 .18 .15 .16 .01 .05 .08 .14  1                     
18.GrContactt  .27 .12 .16 .05 .08 .40 .54 .31 .14 .56 .59 .79 .17 .30 .40 .19 .42  1                   
19.GDPCapit,  .44 .27 .28 .29 .07 .45 .20 .23 .07 .55 .45 .26 .10 .11 .28 .37 .20 .28  1                 
20.GDPGrowit  .22 .01 .07 .03  -.07 .00  -.06  -.05  -.01 .02 .03  -.09 .09 .00  -.08 .00  -.08  -.08  -.02  1               
21.Popit  .00 .08 .05 .12 .05 .19  -.03  -.04 .07 .23 .26 .01  -.03  -.08 .00 .00 .03 .02 .02 .19  1             
22.Year96  -.04 -.02  .06  .13 -.26 -.01 -.07 -.06 -.15 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.10 -.11 -.07 -.03  .01  .06  .00  1           
23.Year97  .03  -.06 .01  -.01  -.11 .00 .01 .00  -.15  -.01  -.01 .03 .01  -.01  -.06  -.07 .19 .09 .00  -.01  -.04  -.21  1         
24.Year98  -.03  -.01 .00 .02  -.01 .00 .01 .04  -.02 .00 .00  -.01  -.02  -.01 .03  -.01  -.08  -.03  -.02  -.15 .00  -.21  -.20  1       
25.Year99  .00 .09  -.04 .02 .31 .01 .04 .19  -.07 .03 .02 .00 .03 .02 .10 .12  -.13  -.06 .01  -.05 .02  -.20  -.20  -.20  1     
26.Year00  .11 .14 .01  -.28 .31 .01 .00 .19  -.01 .04 .02  -.03 .04 .03 .15 .25  -.26  -.11 .02 .17 .01  -.20  -.20  -.20  -.19  1   
27.LoadFactorit-1   .89 .12 .25 .16  -.03 .33 .24 .15 .16 .36 .34 .26 .22 .08 .20 .23 .00 .26 .43 .15  -.03  -.05 .01 .08 .04 .04  1 
Mean  67  389 6.4 .25 .31 .07 4.6 .29 .43  43  17  208 .02  51 7.0  25 4.8 4.8  15 3.4  96 .17 .17 .17 .16 .16  67 
Std. Dev.  6.3  178 2.4 .06 .08 .09 4.8 .18 .26  57  19  169 .05  20 4.4  171 1.6 3.9  12 3.1  189 .38 .37 .38 .37 .37 5.9 
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Table 5.  Description of explicit constellations 
Year/Name Date  Total  Diversity  Density  Members
d 
   founded  traffic
a Posit
c Hub
b    
1995 Global  Excellence
  1990  205.09  0.34  11.29  1.00  DL, SIN, SWR. 
1996 Global  Excellence
  1990  226.14  0.36  11.29  1.00  DL, SIN, SWR. 
1997  Atlantic Excellence  Feb 1997  203.08  0.33  4.11  1.00  AUS, DL, SAB, SWR. 
 Global  Excellence
e  1990  240.68  0.36  11.29  1.00  DL, SIN, SWR. 
 Star  Alliance  May  1997  354.58  0.20  7.28  0.60  AC, LFH, SAS, TAI, UA.
f 
1998  Atlantic Excellence  Feb 1997  216.82  0.33  4.11  1.00  AUS, DL, SAB, SWR. 
  Qualiflyer  May 1998  87.75  0.26  1.20  0.46  AOM, AUS, CRS, LAU, SAB, SWR, TAP, THY. 
 Star  Alliance  May  1997  394.47  0.19  8.40  0.53  AC, LFH, SAS, TAI, UA, VRG. 
1999 Atlantic  Excellence
g  Feb 1997  225.87  0.33  2.85  0.67  AUS, DL, SAB, SWR. 
 Oneworld
  Sep 1998  422.32  0.24  10.65  0.50  AA, BA, CAI, CP, QUA.
h 
  Qualiflyer  May 1998  91.28  0.27  1.28  0.48  AOM, AUS, CRS, SAB, SWR, TAP, THY.
i 
 Star  Alliance  May  1997  445.49  0.26  10.59  0.50  AC, ANZ, ANS, LFH, SAS, TAI, UA, VRG. 
 “Wings”
j  1999 177.52 0.28  6.68  1.00  KLM,  NW. 
2000  Oneworld  Sep 1998  483.32  0.20  9.48  0.61  LIN, AA, BA, CP, FIN, IBR, LCH, QUA. 
  Qualiflyer  May 1998  101.29  0.36  1.25  0.39  LIB, AOM, CRS, LOT, SAB, SWR, TAP, THY.
k 
  SkyTeam  Sep 1999  279.60  0.27  6.13  1.00  AMX, AFR, DL.
l 
  Star Alliance  May 1997  624.81  0.25  10.00  0.42  AC, ANZ, ANA, ANS, AUS, LFH, MEX, SAS, SIN, TAI, UA, VRG. 
 “Wings”  1999  187.66  0.27  6.68  1.00  KLM,  NW. 
Notes: 
a See description of variable TotTraffict(.), Table 2. 
b See description of variable DiversHubt(.), Table 2. 
c See description of variable DiversIntPost(.), Table 2. 
d Abbreviations of names as listed in Table 1. 
e Dissolved in November 1997. 
f Varig joined the group in October 1997. 
g Dissolved in November 1999. 
h Finnair and Iberia joined the group in September 1999. 
i Air Europe is also a member, but was not included in the analysis due to missing data.  However, estimates indicate that it contributes to only about 6.2% of 
the constellation’s total traffic. 
j “Wings” is an unofficial name of the group.  The alliance between KLM and Northwest exists since 1989, but I consider that the group was only officially 
institutionalized with the announcement that Continental and Alitalia would join the group in early 1999, which was later called off. 
k Air Littoral, Portugalia and Volare are also members, but were not included in the analysis due to missing data.  However, estimates indicate that they, 
together, contribute to only about 2.4% of the constellation’s total traffic. 
l Korean Airlines joined the group in July 2000. 
Sources: IATA’s World Air Transport Statistics; Airline Business, several issues; analyses by the author. 
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Table 6.  Description of implicit constellations   
Year/ Total  Diversity  Members











1995 1 413.71  4.84  0.39  LIN, AMX, ALA, AW, BA, CO, GB, KLM, MEX, NW, USA.  .22      
 2 431.46  3.95  0.23  AFL, AC, CHI, AFR, ANA, AUS, BAL, CSA, DL, FIN, IBR, LOT, LFH, MLV, SAB, SWR, TAR, THY.  .04  .36     
 3 317.06  8.79  0.30  ARG, IND, ANS, BMI, EMI, MA, RAJ, SLA, TAP, TWA, UA, VIR.  .00  .06  .24    
 4 129.38  3.37  0.19  ALG, ALI, CYP, EGY, GUL, IRA, KOR, OLY, RAM, SAU, SYR,  TUN.  .03 .06 .04 .23   
 5 510.21 10.50  0.25  ANZ, AA, CAI, CP, JAS, JA, LAB, QUA, SAS, SIN, SAA, TAI, VRG, VSP.  .04  .06  .04  .02  .23 
1996 1 456.39  8.33  0.30  LIN, LIB, ANZ, AW, BA, CAI, GB, LCH, NW, QUA, SAS, USA, VRG.  .22      
 2 119.66  4.73  0.19  AFL, AMX, ALG, AFR, BAL, CRO, EGY, MEX, RAM, TUN, THY.  .00  .24     
 3 480.78  8.96  0.30  ARG, AA, ANS, BMI, CP, JAS, JA, MA, RAJ, SIN, SAA, SLA, TAP, TAI, VIR.  .05  .01  .25    
 4 522.58  4.98  0.27  AC, CHI, ALI, ANA, AUS, CO, CSA, DL, FIN, IBR, KOR, LAU, LOT, LFH, MLV, SAB, SWR, TAR.  .05  .06  .08  .35   
 5 357.94  6.64  0.26  IND, CYP, EMI, GUL, IRA, KLM, LAB, OLY, SAU, SYR, TWA, UA, VSP.  .03  .03  .04  .04  .22 
1997 1 529.65  7.05  0.35  LIN, CHI, ALA, AW, DL, EL, FIN, KLM, KOR, NW, SAB, SIN, TAP.  .26      
 2 281.95  3.20  0.21  AFL, AMX, AFR, ALI, AUS, BAL, CO, CRO, CSA, IBR, LOT, MLV, SWR, TAR, THY, UKR.  .08  .39     
 3 531.64  8.83  0.22  ARG, AC, IND, ANZ, ANS, BMI, CP, EMI, LAU, LFH, MA, SAS, SAA, SLA, TAI, UA, VIR.  .04  .05  .29    
 4  80.37  4.86  0.19  ALG, CYP, EGY, GUL, IRA, LAB, OLY, RAM, SAU, SYR, TUN, VSP.  .01  .06  .03  .20   
 5 543.78  9.08  0.31  LIB, ANA, AA, BA, CAI, GB, JAS, JA, MEX, QUA, VRG.  .04  .04  .07  .01  .25 
1998 1 112.22  3.94  0.22  LIN, AOM, CRO, EGY, LAU, MA, OLY, RAJ, SAB, SLA, TAP, THY.  .20      
 2 453.14  4.63  0.21  AFL, AMX, CHI, AFR, IND, ALI, AUS, BAL, CSA, DL, FIN, IBR, KOR, LOT, MLV, SWR, TAR, UKR.  .10  .39     
 3 603.75  9.16  0.31  ARG, AW, AA, BA, CAI, CO, JAS, JA, LCH, LAB, QUA, VSP.  .01  .07  .26    
 4 273.25  5.39  0.32  ALG, ALA, CYP, GUL, IRA, KLM, NW, RAM, SAU, SYR, TWA, TUN.  .03  .06  .03  .23   
 5 576.00  9.29  0.25  AC, ANZ, ANA, ANS, BMI, EMI, LFH, MEX, SAS, SIN, SAA, TAI, UA, VIR.  .06  .06  .05  .02  .38 
1999 1  88.46  2.20  0.23  LIN, ALG, AOM, CYP, EL, FIN, OLY, RAM, SAB, TAP, TUN.  .24      
 2 432.07  4.98  0.22  AFL, AMX, CHI, AFR, IND, AUS, BAL, CSA, DL, IBR, KOR, LOT, MLV, SWR, TAR, UKR.  .09  .41     
 3 639.17  9.57  0.25  AC, ANZ, ANA, ANS, BMI, EMI, LFH, MEX, SAS, SIN, SAA, TAI, UA, VRG, VIR.  .01  .05  .42    
 4 840.43  8.16  0.33  ALA, ALI, AW, AA, BA, CAI, CO, JAS, JA, KLM, LCH, NW, QUA.  .05  .10  .05  .38   
 5 126.57  4.91  0.27  CRO, EGY, GUL, IRA, MA, RAJ, SLA, SYR, TWA, THY.  .03  .11  .07  .04  .31 
2000 1 521.70  8.68  0.18  LIN, ARG, AA, BA, CAI, CP, EL, FIN, LCH, QUA, SAB, TAP.  .41      
 2 364.13  2.54  0.15  AFL, AFR, ALI, AUS, BAL, CRO, CSA, IBR, IRA, JA, LOT, MLV, RAJ, SWR, SYR, TAR, THY.  .13  .43     
 3 234.20  5.41  0.25  AMX, ALG, CYP, DL, EGY, GUL, OLY, RAM, TUN.  .05  .09  .22    
 4 706.03  8.36  0.20  AC, IND, ANZ, ANA, BMI, EMI, LAU, LFH, MA, MEX, SAS, SIN, SAA, SLA, TAI, UA, VIR.  .03  .09  .03  .38   
 5 469.98  7.92  0.35  CHI, ALA, AW, ANS, CO, JAS, KLM, KOR, NW, TWA, UKR.  .07  .06  .01  .05  .29 
Notes: 
a See description of variable TotTraffict(.), Table 2. 
b See description of variable DiversHubt(.), Table 2. 
c See description of variable DiversIntPost(.), Table 2. 
d Abbreviations of names as listed in Table 1. Composition of groups as revealed by clustering algorithm based on the matrix of bilateral ties among firms. 
e Diagonal entries indicate density of constellation.  Off-diagonal entries indicate density of ties between constellation members and members of other groups. 
Sources: IATA’s World Air Transport Statistics; Airline Business, several issues; analyses by the author. 
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Table 7.  Constellation membership and performance: regression results 
 Explicit  constellations  Implicit constellations 
 Random  effects  Heckman two-stage  Fixed effects  Random effects  Fixed effects 
 (1)  (2a) Probit  (2b) OLS  (3) (4)  (5) 
  LoadFactorit  Prob(Explit = 1)  LoadFactorit  LoadFactorit  LoadFactorit  LoadFactorit 
Constellation-specific           
TotTraffict(Cj)   0.009 
(0.006)




  0.001 
(0.002)
 
DiversHubt(Cj)   -0.075 
(0.251)




  0.134 
(0.113)
 
DiversIntPost(Cj)   11.915 
(9.990)




  -4.943 
(3.857)
 
Densityt(Cj)   1.394
 (4.262)




  -0.408 
(3.898)
 
Member-specific           
RelCapacityit(Cj)   6.488
 (6.869)




†  4.035 
(4.714)
 
DomHubit(Cj)   -0.053 
(0.103)




  -0.017 
(0.077)
 
OutsideTieit(Cj)   0.719
 (2.518)




*  -0.287 
(1.002)
 
InsideTieit(Cj)   2.243
 (2.793)




*  2.012 
(2.219)
 
Controls           























  -0.098 
(0.087)
 




  -1.832 
(2.036)




  -1.841 
(4.400)
 
Cargoit  7.802 
(11.482)
  -2.418 
(2.816)
  11.128 
(8.006)

















  0.004 
(0.158)
 










*  -0.098 
(0.125)
 










  0.004 
(0.002)
 
Contactit(Cj)   0.024
 (0.102)




  -0.220 
(0.150)
 
GrContactt(Cj)   0.004
 (0.070)




  -0.013 
(0.080)
 




























  -6.137 
(2.412)






  81.196 
(26.455)
* 




  0.867 
(0.056)
*  -  0.792
 (0.033)
*  - 
Explit-1  -  2.469
 (0.332)
*  ---   - 
TiesExplicitit  -  2.578
 (0.619)
*  ---   - 
InvMillsit  -  -  -0.370 
(0.508)
--   - 
N  86  442  86  86  401  401 
χ
2  31,992.47*  271.92*  -  -  1,103.81*  - 
F  -  -  23.92*  7.82*  -  5.08* 
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; † p < 0.10 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects).  The table shows parameter estimates and standard 
errors in parenthesis.  All models include year-specific dummy variables.   56
 
 